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INTRODUCTION 
 
On May 27, 2015, the United States Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps) and 
the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) released a rule defining 
the boundaries of federal jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act.1 In other words, 
the Clean Water Rule, as the EPA and the Corps labeled it, helps determine which 
aquatic resources can be protected by the Clean Water Act and which cannot. In 
many circles, the immediate reactions were apoplectic. Industry opponents warned 
of dire consequences.2 Conservative politicians maligned the Clean Water Rule as, 
in Congressman John Boehner’s words, “a raw and tyrannical power grab that will 
crush jobs . . . . and places landowners, small businesses, farmers, and manufacturers 
on the road to a regulatory and economic hell.”3 The House of Representatives 
passed a bill that would set the whole rule aside.4 Dozens of states, along with a wide 
variety of industry and advocacy groups, sued to challenge the rule; one set of cases 
soon generated a nationwide stay.5 Environmental groups sued as well, on the theory 
that the new rule is not protective enough.6 Before the 2016 election, many legal 
commentators expected some of the challenges to reach the U.S. Supreme Court, 
which helped set the rulemaking in motion with two previous decisions on Clean 
Water Act jurisdiction.7 After the election, it seems more likely that the incoming 
                                                      
1 News Release, EPA, Clean Water Rule Protects Streams and Wetlands Critical to 
Public Health, Communities, and Economy (May 27, 2015), 
https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/clean-water-rule-protects-streams-and-wetlands-critical-
public-health-communities-and [https://perma.cc/72QU-36WY]. For the actual rule (as it 
was later published in the Federal Register), see Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of 
the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg. 37,054 (June 29, 2015). 
2 See, e.g., Am. Farm Bureau Fed’n, Clean Water Act, WOTUS, FARM BUREAU, 
http://www.fb.org/issues/regulatory-reform/clean-water-act/ [https://perma.cc/B2X9-
JM2C] (last visited Jan. 8, 2017) (containing materials posted by the American Farm Bureau 
Federation); Justin Sykes, New Obama EPA Water Rules Set to Drown Property Rights, 
Economic Growth, AM. FOR PROSPERITY (June 16, 2014), http://americansforprosperity.org/ 
article/new-obama-epa-water-rules-set-to-drown-property-rights-economic-growth 
[https://perma.cc/XRG9-QJ2P]. 
3 Press Release, Speaker Paul Ryan’s Press Office, Speaker Boehner on the Latest EPA 
Power Grab (May 27, 2015), http://www.speaker.gov/press-release/speaker-boehner-latest-
epa-power-grab [https://perma.cc/MTS6-P8F8]; see also, Jennifer Yachnin, House 
Republican Compares WOTUS to Terrorism, the Plague, GREENWIRE (Nov. 23, 2015), 
http://www.eenews.net/greenwire/2015/11/23/stories/1060028451 [https://perma.cc/5WP9-
DYP7]. 
4 Regulatory Integrity Protection Act of 2015, H.R. 1732, 114th Cong. (2015). 
5 Timothy Cama, 27 States Challenge Obama Water Rule in Court, HILL (June 30, 
2015, 12:02 PM), http://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/246539-27-states-
challenge-obama-water-rule-in-court [https://perma.cc/ZTK9-R6VG]. 
6 Press Release, Center for Biological Diversity, Lawsuit Challenges Loopholes in New 
EPA Rule Exempting Wetlands and Streams From Clean Water Act Protections (July 22, 
2015), http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/news/press_releases/2015/clean-water-act-07-22-
2015.html [https://perma.cc/4W73-FN8C]. 
7 Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 756–57 (2006); Solid Waste Agency of N. 
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Trump Administration will attempt to withdraw the rule. According to the EPA and 
the Corps, the rule itself would not actually change very much; the agencies predict 
“an approximate 3 percent increase in assertion of jurisdiction when compared to 
2009-2010 field practice.”8 But much of the rhetoric has been apocalyptic. 
It would be easy to react to all of this by yawning. Nearly any federal 
environmental initiative now provokes a similar reaction. Indeed, just a few months 
later, the EPA released another major rule, this one governing greenhouse gas 
emissions, and the same doomsday warnings and press releases all trotted out again, 
followed nearly immediately by bills and lawsuits.9 We live, it sometimes seems, in 
an era when environmental policymaking resembles trench warfare, with zero-sum 
legal battles playing out over every major initiative, and with very little apparent 
movement. Within academic circles, lamenting these circumstances has become 
almost cliché. Accounts of the increasing polarization of environmental politics, and 
of gridlock, ossification, and logjams, are common, as are wishful comparisons to 
the 1970s, a time when environmental legislation emerged from Congress quickly 
and with bipartisan support.10 We have been stuck, it seems, and the contrast 
between an ostensibly modest water quality rule and its outraged reception is just 
another reminder of the reasons why. 
This Article does not dispute the accuracy of that narrative, at least in some 
circumstances. But in the arenas governed by the Clean Water Rule, policy actually 
never got stuck. It has been evolving in consequential ways. The Clean Water Rule 
defines the geographic scope of several regulatory programs, one of which governs 
discharges of dredged or fill material into “waters of the United States.”11 That 
                                                      
Cook Cty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 172–73 (2001). 
8 U.S. EPA & U.S. DEPT. OF THE ARMY, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE EPA-ARMY 
CLEAN WATER RULE 2 (2015). In internal memoranda that then leaked to the public, some 
Corps staff members raised concerns that this estimate might be high, and that the new rule 
would actually reduce protection of some wetlands. See Amena H. Saiyid, Support 
Documents for Water Rule “Flawed”: Corps Memo, BLOOMBERG BNA (July 28, 2015), 
http://www.bna.com/support-documents-water-n17179933980/ [https://perma.cc/D7DR-
GM3C]. 
9 See Joby Warrick & Steven Mufson, Foes of Clean-Air Rule Plan Multiple Front 
Battle, WASH. POST (August 3, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-
science/opponents-lay-groundwork-for-state-by-state-fight-against-polluton-curbs/2015/08/ 
03/d3418320-3a26-11e5-8e98-115a3cf7d7ae_story.html [https://perma.cc/XL8F-WCAB]. 
10 See, e.g., Carol A. Casazza Herman et al., The Breaking The Logjam Project, 17 
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 1–2 (2008) (“[P]olitical polarization and a lack of leadership have left 
environmental protection in the United States burdened with obsolescent statutes and 
regulatory strategies. As a result, the country has failed to deal effectively or decisively with 
many pressing old environmental problems as well as newly emerging ones.”); David W. 
Case, The Lost Generation: Environmental Regulatory Reform in the Era of Congressional 
Abdication, 25 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 49, 50–53 (2014); Sandra Zellmer, Treading 
Water While Congress Ignores the Nation’s Environment, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2323, 
2323–40 (2013). 
11 See 33 U.S.C.A. § 1344 (West 2016). For an excellent overview of the program, see 
ROYAL C. GARDNER, LAWYERS, SWAMPS, AND MONEY: WETLAND LAW, POLICY, AND 
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program—often referred to as “the 404 program,” after the statutory section that 
authorizes it, or as “the wetlands program”—is well known to environmental 
lawyers. Every major environmental law casebook covers it,12 and abundant 
litigation, including multiple Supreme Court cases, has arisen from it.13 But despite 
that familiarity, many environmental lawyers do not realize that the 404 program is 
changing, or that the Clean Water Rule reflects—and would, to a very modest extent, 
advance—those changes.14  
Instead of wetlands, the most important changes involve little streams. Those 
little streams15 are now a central focus of regulatory attention after years of falling 
largely beyond the reach of Clean Water Act regulation.16 The nature of stream 
regulation is also changing, with new permitting mechanisms, guidance documents, 
and techniques for rehabilitating streams all continuing to emerge.17 The Clean 
Water Rule reflects that shifted emphasis; clarifying jurisdiction over tributaries is 
one of its central goals.18 But despite all the kerfuffle surrounding the rule, it 
represents just an incremental step in a journey that began years earlier, largely 
unnoticed by legal commentators, and has continued through multiple regulatory 
decisions and under multiple presidential administrations.19 
This Article chronicles that transformation. Part I begins with a brief overview 
of the environmental resource at the heart of the controversy, explaining why small 
streams are both ecologically important and difficult to protect. Part II then 
                                                      
POLITICS 38–56 (2011). 
12 See, e.g., HOLLY DOREMUS ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY LAW: PROBLEMS, 
CASES, AND READINGS 380–411 (6th ed. 2012); DANIEL A. FARBER & ANN E. CARLSON, 
CASES AND MATERIALS ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 702–34 (9th ed. 2014); ROBERT V. 
PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY 749–61 (6th 
ed. 2009); RICHARD L. REVESZ, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 1060–87 (2nd ed. 2012); 
J.B. RUHL ET AL., THE PRACTICE AND POLICY OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 244–80 (3d ed. 
2010). 
13 See Dave Owen, Regional Federal Administration, 63 UCLA L. REV. 58, 83 (2016) 
(citing a partial list of prominent cases). 
14 So long as the rule is stayed, of course, no such advancement can occur. 
15 The EPA and scientists often use the phrase “headwater streams,” which the EPA 
defines as “the smallest parts of river and stream networks. . . . They are the part of rivers 
furthest from the river’s endpoint or confluence with another stream.” Research in Action: 
Headwater Streams Studies, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/water-research/headwater-streams-
studies [https://perma.cc/7HR7-T9D9] (last visited Jan. 8, 2017). That isn’t a particularly 
precise definition, and in practice, the phrase is often extended to small streams that 
discharge directly to a river’s mainstem, or to lakes or the ocean. “Little streams,” though it 
sounds less scientific, more accurately describes the range of streams discussed in this 
Article. 
16 See infra Part II.C. 
17 See infra Part II.C. 
18 See 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,058–59 (June 29, 2015) (summarizing the rule, which extends 
jurisdiction to all tributary streams and makes wetland protection contingent upon those 
wetlands’ proximity to other jurisdictional waterways). 
19 See infra part II.C. 
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chronicles the evolution of federal stream protection, drawing heavily on a series of 
interviews with regulators and others who were involved in that evolution.20 For 
many years after the enactment of the Clean Water Act, that protection was largely 
nonexistent. Even in the 1980s and early 1990s, when wetlands protection emerged 
as a cause célèbre, stream protection languished. But over time, a combination of 
scientific advances, evolving agency cultures, and legal changes turned attention to 
even the smallest of flowing waterways.21 Many environmental lawyers and most 
environmental law casebooks still refer to the 404 program as “the wetlands 
program,” as though stream protections were inconsequential.22 But that framing is 
obsolete. Protecting streams is now at the program’s heart.23 
Part III then considers what broader significance that transformation holds for 
environmental and administrative law. The still-unfolding history of stream 
regulation, like most history, is messy, and this is not a story with a single clear 
moral. Indeed, the clearest lessons that emerge from this story are reminders of how 
complicated and unpredictable environmental lawmaking can be. Nevertheless, 
elements of that history have been intriguingly inconsistent with many of the 
recurring narratives of contemporary environmental law. This is decidedly not a 
story of stagnation; environmental protection has expanded, dramatically, and is 
becoming more sophisticated.24 Nor is it simply a story of heavily politicized 
policymaking—though the politics of stream protection are intense—or of captured 
agencies. Many changes in protection emanated from relatively conservative regions 
of the country, and major developments occurred under Republican presidential 
administrations.25 Nor, finally, is it simply a story of zero-sum conflict. While the 
scope of regulatory protections has expanded, so too have efforts to increase the 
efficiency of regulatory approaches.26  
Lest this all sound a bit too rosy, there are caveats. Some changes have been 
bitterly contested, and the jury is still out on just how effective some of the new 
regulatory approaches will turn out to be.27 The next chapter of the story also will 
                                                      
20 I initially conducted most of these interviews in connection with a research project 
focused on the roles of regional offices within the federal government. See Owen, supra note 
13. A few of the interviews were specific to this particular research project. 
21 See, e.g., J.L. Meyer & J.B. Wallace, Lost Linkages and Lotic Ecology: 
Rediscovering Small Streams, in ECOLOGY: ACHIEVEMENT AND CHALLENGE 295, 304 
(Malcolm C. Press et al. eds., 2001). 
22 See Case, supra note 10; Zellmer, supra note 10; Casazza Herman et al., supra note 
10 (All of these casebooks cited there identify the 404 program with wetland protection.). 
23 See Rebecca Lave et al., Why You Should Pay Attention to Stream Mitigation 
Banking, 26 ECOLOGICAL RESTORATION 287, 287 (2008) (“An informal survey of EPA 
regional regulatory staff suggests that in many regions 50 percent or more of the individual 
permits issued by the Corps every year are for impacts to streams.”). 
24 See infra Section II.C. 
25 5See infra Section II.C. 
26 See infra notes 323–326 and accompanying text. 
27 See, e.g., Margaret A. Palmer & Kelly L. Hondula, Restoration as Mitigation: 
Analysis of Stream Mitigation for Coal Mining Impacts in Southern Appalachia, 48 ENVTL. 
SCI. & TECH. 10,552, 10,558 (2014). 
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unfold under a presidential administration and Congress that have made no secret 
about their hostility to environmental regulation. As this Article goes to press, the 
implications of that hostility are far from clear. But the story, though not without 
troubling elements, still provides a reminder of the importance of alternative, and 
fundamentally more optimistic, narratives of modern American environmental law. 
In those alternative narratives, the history of environmental law is not just a tale of 
increasing gridlock and adversarialism, or of captured agencies and litigious trench 
warfare. Instead, it involves incremental, ongoing, and often agency-driven progress 
toward turning the sweeping mandates of environmental statutes into real, and 
workable, protections. Whether the regulatory history of little streams will continue 
to follow that trajectory is now a question that hangs in the balance. But for the 
moment, at least, the story of little streams is a story of environmental law continuing 
to come of age. 
 
I.  THE BIG IMPORTANCE OF LITTLE STREAMS  
 
Imagine, for a moment, that you are flying over the Potomac River, heading 
upstream. You begin at the estuary, where freshwater mixes with the brackish waters 
of Chesapeake Bay. Here the river is wide, and boats large and small ply its waters. 
Further upstream, past Washington, D.C. and above the Great Falls, the river 
narrows. With each tributary you pass, the flow diminishes, but for miles, the river 
is still deep enough for motorboats and canoes. Eventually you turn and fly 
southwest above one of those tributaries. As you move from the piedmont plain into 
the foothills of the Blue Ridge Mountains, the gradient steepens, and pools and 
riffles, where fly fishermen cast their lines, replace the longer flatwater reaches of 
the river mainstem. But eventually, the tributary stream becomes too small to fish, 
and then, farther up, too small to see. The forest canopy closes over it, and the only 
visual evidence of a stream is a slight v-shaped valley cutting through the landscape.  
If you descend to the ground surface and walk onward and upward, you might 
then see a small, perennial stream turn into a series of disconnected pools, where 
continuous flow appears primarily during periods of wet weather. This stretch would 
be what hydrologists refer to as an intermittent stream (as opposed to a perennial 
stream, which flows year-round).28 Farther up, you would walk along tiny channels 
that flow only during and immediately after rainstorms or periods of snowmelt—
ephemeral streams, in hydrologic parlance.29 And throughout your journey, you 
would cross many other small tributaries, all forming a network across the 
landscape, much like the capillaries that convey blood through the far reaches of our 
bodies or the twigs and branches that transport sustenance from a tree’s leaves to its 
trunk.30 
                                                      
28 U.S. EPA, CONNECTIVITY OF STREAMS AND WETLANDS TO DOWNSTREAM WATERS: 
A REVIEW AND SYNTHESIS OF THE SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 2–14 (2015) [hereinafter 
CONNECTIVITY OF STREAMS AND WETLANDS TO DOWNSTREAM WATERS]. 
29 Id. 
30 Importantly, not all small streams are located at the far and uppermost reaches of 
watersheds. Some are, but many small streams discharge directly into the mainstems of larger 
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But you might not choose to go that far. Rivers, after all, have long been central 
to human culture; our stories and songs celebrate the Mississippi and the 
Shenandoah, not the tiny streams where those illustrious rivers begin. For years, 
scientists also focused much of their attention upon larger waterways.31 But in the 
past two decades, that has begun to change. Scientific journals are now filled with 
studies of the ecology of small streams, and of the ecological connections between 
small tributaries and larger waters downstream.32 Those connections form the 
scientific foundation for the legal evolution described by this Article, and this Part 
therefore provides a brief synopsis of the emerging literature. 
 
A.  The Functions of Little Streams 
 
The importance of small streams stems in part from their sheer abundance. 
Headwater streams are, as many studies have noted, “the most abundant streams in 
both number and length in a stream network.”33 Statistics on ephemeral and 
intermittent streams—which are a subset of the broader category of headwater 
streams—reinforce the prevalence of small waterways, particularly in arid areas.34 
Beyond sheer abundance, small streams also serve important functions, some of 
which are summarized in more detail below. 
 
1.  Conveying Water 
 
One the most important functions of little streams is to convey water to larger 
waterways. Most of the water in a major river first flows through a small stream.35 
And while that may sound like a truism, it has important implications. As tributaries 
change, so too will flows through the river’s mainstem.   
Those flows will not disappear (unless the changes involve diverting water 
away); water will still fall from the sky and proceed downhill, one way or another. 
But the water is likely to move through different pathways and at a different pace.36 
                                                      
rivers or, in coastal areas, to the ocean. 
31 See K. Bishop et al., Aqua Incognita: The Unknown Headwaters, 22 HYDROLOGIC 
PROCESSES 1239 (2008); Thibault Daltry et al., Intermittent Rivers: A Challenge for 
Freshwater Ecology, 64 BIOSCIENCE 229 (2014) (“Intermittent rivers are a recent addition 
to the field of freshwater ecology.”); Winsor H. Lowe & Gene E. Likens, Moving Headwater 
Streams to the Head of the Class, 55 BIOSCIENCE 196 (2005). 
32 See generally CONNECTIVITY OF STREAMS AND WETLANDS TO DOWNSTREAM 
WATERS, supra note 28 (compiling and summarizing studies). 
33 Tracie-Lynn Nadeau & Mark Cable Rains, Hydrologic Connectivity Between 
Headwater Streams and Downstream Waters: How Science Can Inform Policy, 43 J. AM. 
WATER WORKS ASS’N 118, 120 (2007). 
34 U.S. EPA, THE ECOLOGICAL AND HYDROLOGICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF EPHEMERAL 
AND INTERMITTENT STREAMS IN THE ARID AND SEMI-ARID AMERICAN SOUTHWEST 5 (2008). 
35 CONNECTIVITY OF STREAMS AND WETLANDS TO DOWNSTREAM WATERS, supra note 
28, at 3–5. 
36 See COMM. ON REDUCING STORMWATER DISCHARGE CONTRIBUTIONS TO WATER 
POLLUTION, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, URBAN STORMWATER MANAGEMENT IN THE 
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A common consequence of stream filling is flooding, as water that once moved 
slowly through a stream’s riffles and pools, or seeped into the stream from the 
shallow groundwater table, now speeds over a more impervious urban landscape.37 
That consequence can propagate downstream, often in the form of a flood.38 
Conversely, paving landscapes and filling streams can reduce river flows in periods 
between precipitation events. Because water that would have made its way slowly 
through the stream and its adjacent aquifers now has been flushed rapidly through 
the system, less remains during the periods when the weather is dry.39 Small tributary 
streams therefore act like natural reservoirs; they mitigate the extremes of both flood 
and drought. 
 
2.  Nutrients, Sediment, Chemistry, and More 
 
Nonscientists are generally accustomed to thinking of rivers and streams as 
conveyance systems for water, or, perhaps, as habitat for relatively charismatic 
species like sportfish or birds. But rivers and streams are vectors for many other 
things: carbon, nutrients, minerals, sediment, warm or cold temperatures, rocks and 
fallen trees, and a huge variety of living organisms.40 They exchange those things 
not just up- and downstream within the river system, but also with surrounding 
wetlands and terrestrial landscapes.41 Collectively, the presence or absence of these 
things defines the water quality of the system; to an ecologist—and to the Clean 
Water Act—water quality does not just mean an absence of toxic contaminants.42   
Little streams play crucial roles within these conveyance systems.43 That is 
partly because they provide physically distinctive environments; rich ecosystems 
often contain a diversity of habitat types,44 and small streams are structurally, 
biologically, and chemically different from larger downstream waterways. 
Additionally, water within those streams is, on average, physically closer to the 
streambed and to the surrounding landscape. That physical proximity promotes a 
                                                      
UNITED STATES 151–153 (2009) (describing changed flow pathways). 
37 See id. 
38 See id. at 166–70. 
39 See Emily S. Bernhardt & Margaret A. Palmer, Restoring Streams in an Urbanizing 
World, 52 FRESHWATER BIOLOGY 738, 740 (2007). 
40 See generally CONNECTIVITY OF STREAMS AND WETLANDS, supra note 28, at 3-1 to 
347 (describing these functions). 
41 See CONNECTIVITY OF STREAMS AND WETLANDS, supra note 28, at 13 (describing 
different types of connectivity). 
42 33 U.S.C.A. § 1362(19) (West 2016) (defining pollution to include “the man-made 
or man-induced alteration of the chemical, physical, biological, and radiological integrity of 
water”); see PUD No. 1 of Jefferson Cty. v. Wash. Dep’t. of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 719 
(1994) (noting the broad conception of water quality indicated by this definition). 
43 See Meyer & Wallace, supra note 21, at 296 (“Headwater streams are tightly linked 
with the larger landscape . . . .”). 
44 See J. Tews et al., Animal Species Diversity Driven by Habitat 
Heterogeneity/Diversity: The Importance of Keystone Structures, 31 J. BIOGEOGRAPHY 79, 
79 (2004). 
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wide variety of interactions, many with ripple effects extending throughout the river 
system.45   
One of the best examples of these phenomena involves nutrient processing. Any 
waterway, even in an undeveloped landscape, receives nutrients like phosphorous 
and nitrogen from the surrounding landscape.46 Those nutrients form the building 
blocks of life within the waterway.47 But excess fertilizer from lawns and 
agricultural fields, atmospheric deposition of nitrogen oxides, and wastewater 
discharges can all overload aquatic systems with nutrients, fueling toxic algae 
blooms, depleting oxygen from the water column, and creating dead zones where 
aquatic life cannot survive.48 These problems recur across the country, and their 
scale can be massive.49 In the Gulf of Mexico, for example, a dead zone forms each 
summer, fed by nutrients discharged from the Mississippi River; it can be larger than 
the state of Connecticut.50 
These algae blooms and dead zones in downstream waters are directly related 
to tributary streams.51 In part, that is because tributaries serve as conduits for 
delivering nutrients; just as much of the water in a river system comes from small 
tributaries, so too does a large portion of the nutrients.52 But little streams also are 
particularly effective at processing, and thus removing, some of the nutrients that 
flow off the surrounding terrestrial landscape.53 That is partly because of the sheer 
number of small streams in a watershed, and also partly because the shallow depth 
of small streams keeps water in closer contact with the substrate, where many of the 
organisms that process nutrients live.54 When those streams are straightened, filled, 
                                                      
45 See Jonathan P. Benstead & David S. Leigh, An Expanded Role for River Networks, 
5 NATURE GEOSCIENCE 678, 679 (2012) (“[S]mall streams and river ecosystems tend to be 
particularly active, from a biogeochemical perspective, because the water they convey has a 
great deal of contact with both the benthic substrate and the atmosphere.”). 
46 See Richard B. Alexander et al., The Role of Headwater Streams in Downstream 
Water Quality, 43 J. AM. WATER RESOURCES ASS’N 41, 43 (2007). 
47 Id. at 42. 
48 Id. 
49 See U.S. EPA, NATIONAL SUMMARY OF STATE INFORMATION (2016), 
http://ofmpub.epa.gov/waters10/attains_nation_cy.control#causes [https://perma.cc/X6KA-
9P9H] (listing nutrients as the third leading cause of impairment in the United States’ rivers 
and streams). 
50 U.S. EPA, NORTHERN GULF OF MEXICO HYPOXIC ZONE, http://water.epa.gov/type/ 
watersheds/named/msbasin/zone.cfm [https://perma.cc/EG43-6QQ9]. 
51 See Richard B. Alexander et al., Dynamic Modeling of Nitrogen Losses in River 
Networks Unravels the Coupled Effects of Hydrologic and Biogeochemical Processes, 93 
BIOGEOCHEMISTRY 91, 110 (2009) (“[D]elivery of nitrate to downstream waters . . . is 
strongly affected by the cumulative removal of nitrate in headwater and higher order 
streams. . . .”); see CONNECTIVITY OF STREAMS & WETLANDS TO DOWNSTREAM WATERS, 
supra note 28, at 3-23 to 3-28 (summarizing multiple studies). 
52 Alexander et al., supra note 51, at 44. 
53 Id. at 46 (“[R]ates of nitrogen uptake . . . . generally decline in a downstream direction 
with increases in stream size.”). 
54 Id. 
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turned into fertilized fields, or replaced with culverts, they lose much of their 
capacity to process nutrients, and downstream loading, with all of its attendant 
problems, increases.55  
Nutrient processing is a particularly important role of little streams, but it is by 
no means the only one. Little streams also help process and transform the carbon 
that flows through river systems.56 They serve as both sinks and, during flood events, 
sources of sediment.57 Fallen branches and trees—which ecologists refer to as large 
woody debris58—often accumulate in headwater streams, where they provide shade 
and shelter, help dissipate the streams’ energy, and reduce erosion.59 When flood 
events wash that debris downstream, it provides important habitat for a variety of 
aquatic species.60 And while little streams can convey introduced pollutants into 
downstream waterways, they also can retain some of that pollution, keeping it out 
of larger river systems. For all of these reasons, little streams play important roles in 
defining the chemistry, flow, and structure—what the Clean Water Act refers to as 
chemical and physical integrity—of downstream waterways.61 
 
3.  Biodiversity 
 
Little streams also play important roles in supporting and conveying living 
things. For scientists, this is a somewhat new insight; for many years they tended to 
view small streams as areas of marginal biodiversity.62 They had some basis for that 
view; fish tend to be present in greater diversity and abundance in larger streams and 
rivers.63 But more recent studies have revealed that small streams can be biodiversity 
hotspots on their own.64 Large fish may not thrive, but microbes, algae, insects, 
crustaceans, and amphibians often do; those species disperse downstream and into  
 
                                                      
55 See Mary C. Freeman et al., Hydrologic Connectivity and the Contribution of Stream 
Headwaters to Ecological Integrity at Regional Scales, 43 J. AM. WATER WORKS ASS’N 5, 
8–9 (2007). 
56 CONNECTIVITY OF STREAMS & WETLANDS TO DOWNSTREAM WATERS, supra note 
28, at 3-23 (“A large body of literature has demonstrated that headwater streams modify and 
export organic carbon that significantly affects ecosystem processes throughout the river 
network.”). 
57 Id. at 3-13. 
58 See, e.g., N.S. Lassettre & G.M. Kondolf, Large Woody Debris in Urban Stream 
Channels: Redefining the Problem, 28 RIVER RES. AND APPLICATIONS 1477 (2012). 
59 CONNECTIVITY OF STREAMS & WETLANDS TO DOWNSTREAM WATERS, supra note 
28, at 3-17 to 3-18. 
60 Id. 
61 33 U.S.C.A § 1251(a) (West 2016) (“The objective of this chapter is to restore and 
maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.”). 
62 See Daltry et al., supra note 31, at 230 (“Intermittent rivers have long been viewed 
as species poor, and dry channels have been viewed as biologically inactive systems.”). 
63 See id. 
64 See Judy L. Meyer et al., The Contribution of Headwater Streams to Biodiversity in 
River Networks, 43 J. AM. WATER RESOURCES ASS’N 86, 86 (2007). 
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surrounding terrestrial habitats, providing prey for birds, fish, and a wide variety of 
other living things.65   
Small streams also sustain species that live primarily within larger waterways. 
Some species, like coho salmon, rely on tributary waters as relatively predator-free 
nurseries.66 Those tributary streams also can serve as refuges when conditions in 
larger waterways are hostile for other reasons, like high temperatures or competition 
from invasive species.67 If more tolerable conditions return to the downstream 
waters, those refuges then can become source areas for repopulation, allowing a 
species to persist where it otherwise might have been extirpated.68 
For all of these reasons, there is now a strong consensus in the scientific 
literature that protecting the water quality of rivers, lakes, and oceans necessitates 
protecting their tributary streams.69 Again, this emphasis is somewhat new; these 
connections were not extensively documented in scientific literature twenty or thirty 
years ago.70 But interest in small streams has grown dramatically. Perhaps the best 
evidence of that change, and of its regulatory significance, is the scientific-basis 
document associated with the recent Clean Water Rule.71 That report cites dozens of 
studies of stream ecology, many focused on small waterways, and concludes that 
“[t]he scientific literature unequivocally demonstrates that streams, individually or 
cumulatively, exert a strong influence on the integrity of downstream waters.”72 As 
the report notes, the contribution of any individual tributary to downstream water 
quality may be quite small.73 But the collective impact of thousands of streams, the 
report finds, is enormous.74 
 
B.  The Threats, and Their Implications 
 
This Part began with a scenic tour of the Potomac River, but my description left 
out something important. It contained little mention of human alteration of the river 
system. Yet the Potomac River watershed, like river systems throughout the rest of 
the United States and much of the world, has been drastically altered by dams, 
                                                      
65 See id.; Freeman et al., supra note 55, at 9–10. 
66 Meyer et al., supra note 64, at 91–92. 
67 See STEPHEN P. PRICE et al., The Ecological Importance of Tributaries and 
Confluences, in RIVER CONFLUENCES, TRIBUTARIES, AND THE FLUVIAL NETWORK 209, 212 
(Stephen P. Rice et al. eds., 2008). 
68 Meyer et al., supra note 64, at 98. 
69 See V. Acuña et al., Why Should We Care About Temporary Waterways?, 343 SCI. 
1080–81 (2014); Freeman et al., supra note 55, at 6 (“Every important aspect of the river 
ecosystem, the river geomorphic system, and the river chemical system begins in headwater 
streams.”). 
70 See Bishop et al., supra note 31, at 1239–40 (critiquing the relative lack of knowledge 
about headwater streams). 
71 CONNECTIVITY OF STREAMS AND WETLANDS TO DOWNSTREAM WATERS, supra note 
28. 
72 Id. at ES-2. 
73 Id. at ES-5. 
74 Id.  
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pollution, water withdrawals, filling, floodplain development, and other sources of 
impact. In this watershed, and many others, some of the heaviest impacts have fallen 
upon the smallest streams.75   
If we had diverged from the mainstream and tried to follow a tributary through 
the Washington, D.C. suburbs, we almost certainly would have found a case study 
in poor water quality.76 Indeed, the stream might simply have disappeared into a 
series of buried culverts.77 Similarly, if it flowed through an agricultural area, the 
stream might have been diverted or converted into an irrigation ditch, filled, or 
deprived of its recharge by groundwater pumping.78 Farther southwest, beyond the 
boundaries of the Potomac Basin, we might encounter the most dramatic impacts of 
all. Hundreds of miles of headwater streams now lie “entombed,” to use one article’s 
evocative but accurate phrase, beneath the piles of rubble left over after nearby 
mountaintops were removed and relieved of their underlying coal.79 Overlying these 
site-specific impacts is a broader threat. Climate change, with its heat, droughts, and 
floods, is heightening strains on aquatic ecosystems of all kinds, and little streams 
are by no means immune.80 
The aggregate scale of these impacts is vast. In part, that is a function of 
geographic prevalence; small streams reach into so much of the landscape, they are 
particularly likely to get in the way of people’s ambitions.81 And because of their 
small size and relative anonymity (and because the public has no claim of legal 
ownership of the bed and banks of a nonnavigable stream), they traditionally seemed 
easy to divert or fill.82 Indeed, landowners may not even perceive a little stream as a 
stream, particularly if it appears on no map; one recent study found that many owners 
denied the presence of streams that were readily apparent to scientists.83    
                                                      
75 Meyer & Wallace, supra note 21, at 302 (“[S]mall streams . . . are being lost from 
the landscape at an alarming rate.”). 
76 See generally CTR. FOR WATERSHED PROT., IMPACTS OF IMPERVIOUS COVER ON 
AQUATIC SYS. 2 (2003). 
77 See Allison H. Roy et al., Urbanization Affects the Extent and Hydrologic 
Permanence of Headwater Streams in a Midwestern US Metropolitan Area, 28 J. N. AM. 
BENTHOLOGICAL SOC’Y 911, 914 (2009) (describing the disappearance of urban streams). 
78 See Jeffrey A. Falke et al., The Role of Groundwater Pumping and Drought in 
Shaping Ecological Futures for Stream Fishes in a Dryland River Basin of the Western Great 
Plains, USA, 4 ECOHYDROLOGY 682, 692–93 (2011); Meyer & Wallace, supra note 21, at 
302–03. 
79 Meyer & Wallace, supra note 21, at 305. 
80 See generally JIMÉNEZ CISNEROS ET AL., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE 
CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY 229–57 
(Zbigniew Kundzewicz ed., 2014) (summarizing impacts on freshwater resources). 
81 See Meyer & Wallace, supra note 21, at 302 (“Because they are small and numerous, 
they have been viewed as unimportant, insignificant or a general nuisance. . . .”). 
82 See State v. McIlroy, 595 S.W.2d 659, 663 (Ark. 1980) (“Determining the 
navigability of a stream is essentially a matter of deciding if it is public or private property.”). 
83 Andrea Armstrong et al., What’s a Stream Without Water? Disproportionality in 
Headwater Regions Impacting Water Quality, 50 ENVTL. MGMT. 849, 856 (2012) (“Eighteen 
(55%) of the ‘no stream’ parcels had visible surface water flows or channels within the 
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The scale of impacts is also large because small streams tend to be sensitive.84 
Unlike rivers, which have the capacity to dilute away some pollution loading, small 
streams can be transformed by even a short-term event like a heavy rainstorm.85 
Because of that sensitivity, even streams that have not been physically removed are 
still often heavily impacted. In urban and suburban settings, for example, poor water 
quality is so common in small streams that scientists have coined a shorthand 
phrase—urban stream syndrome—to describe it.86 
Those widespread impacts underscore the importance of legal protection for 
small streams, for protecting important and imperiled resources is one of the core 
tasks of environmental law. But the impacts also underscore the associated 
challenges; many protective practices have direct costs. Creating stream buffers 
within agricultural fields or timber harvest areas, for example, can seem like a zero-
sum game, as every square foot that goes into the buffer comes out of crop 
production.87 Similarly, preserving space for streams means not using that space for 
houses, roads, or valley fills.88 Sometimes our perceptions of zero-sum conflict can 
be wrong; stream protection can benefit landowners.89 For example, so-called “green 
infrastructure,” which processes stormwater runoff without the need for expensive 
treatment facilities, has real value, as many urban stormwater managers have 
belatedly discovered.90 But we would not have filled, polluted, diverted, dammed, 
                                                      
property boundaries.”). Armstrong and her coauthors also found that “landowners with more 
regularly flowing streams were more concerned about stream water quality.” Id. See also 
Meyer & Wallace, supra note 21, at 302 (“Society considers [headwater streams] of such 
little value that they are ignored.”). 
84 See Palmer & Hondula, supra note 27, at 10,552 (“Streams and rivers are among the 
most threatened ecosystem types on earth and the most vulnerable are the smallest 
tributaries. . . .”). 
85 See Dave Owen, Urbanization, Water Quality, and the Regulated Landscape, 82 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 431, 441–43 (2011) (describing stressors, many of them short-term, that affect 
small urban watersheds). 
86 See Christopher J. Walsh et al., The Urban Stream Syndrome: Current Knowledge 
and the Search for a Cure, 24 J. N. AM. BENTHOLOGICAL SOC’Y 706, 706 (2005). 
87 See Sarah Taylor Lovell & William C. Sullivan, Environmental benefits of 
conservation buffers in the United States: Evidence, promise, and open questions, 112 
AGRIC., ECOSYSTEMS, & ENV’T 249, 254 (2005) (“The most obvious cost of buffers results 
from the lost profit when land is taken out of production and established as a natural area.”); 
see, e.g., Pronsolino v. Nastri, 291 F.3d 1123, 1129–30 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing timber 
harvesters’ estimates of the costs of practices designed to protect water quality). 
88 See, e.g., Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. v. Aracoma Coal Co., 556 F.3d 177, 186–77 
(2009) (describing valley fills—which were 68,841 linear feet in length—associated with 
four coal mining projects); CLAUDIA COPELAND, MOUNTAINTOP MINING: BACKGROUND ON 
CURRENT CONTROVERSIES 4 (2015) (noting mining industry arguments that southern 
Appalachian coal mining “would not be economic or feasible if producers were restricted 
from using valleys for the disposal of mining overburden.”). 
89 See Lovell & Sullivan, supra note 87, at 254 (citing ways that buffers can benefit 
landowners). 
90 See U.S. EPA, THE ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF GREEN INFRASTRUCTURE (2014); 
Margaret A. Palmer et al., Manage Water in a Green Way, 349 SCI. 584, 584 (2015). 
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and otherwise impacted so many little streams if protecting them had seemed 
convenient. 
Beneath these practical considerations lurks a more legal reason why headwater 
stream protection can be challenging. Small streams—particularly those with 
intermittent or ephemeral flow—defy the boundaries between water and land. And 
that boundary region has sometimes been an uncomfortable zone for environmental 
law.91 In the United States, at least, protecting the environment is widely accepted 
as an appropriate role for the federal government, but legal rhetoric often assigns 
responsibility for land use planning to state and local authorities.92 In practice, that 
division can become blurry, and within the field of stream and wetlands protection, 
lower courts have often acquiesced to federal exercises of jurisdiction over places 
that are dry more often than they are wet.93 But twice in the past fifteen years—first 
in Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S Army Corps of Engineers,94 
and then again in Rapanos v. United States95—the U.S. Supreme Court has signaled 
its discomfort with federal water quality protections that verge onto land use 
regulation.96 The Court has not articulated any clear doctrinal rule giving effect to 
its fears, and perhaps it never will; the boundaries between federal and state authority 
are much easier for judges to extoll than they are to draw. But the Court’s opinions 
do indicate that future federal protection of small streams will confront not just the 
practical difficulties of changing longstanding and widespread practices, but also the 
blurry-edged shadows of a particular vision of American federalism.97 State or local 
protection can escape those shadows, but in many states, meaningful and widespread 
protections for streams have not been forthcoming.98 
 
                                                      
91 See Owen, supra note 85, at 476–80. 
92 See id. (summarizing rhetoric from Congress and the U.S. Supreme Court). 
93 See, e.g., Quivira Mining Co. v. EPA, 765 F.2d 126, 130 (10th Cir. 1985) (upholding 
the EPA’s regulatory jurisdiction over a largely dry arroyo). 
94 531 U.S. 159 (2001). 
95 547 U.S. 715 (2006).  
96 Id. at 738 (“The extensive federal jurisdiction urged by the Government would 
authorize the Corps to function as a de facto regulator of immense stretches of intrastate 
land . . . . [T]he Corps’ interpretation stretches the outer limits of Congress’s commerce 
power and raises difficult questions about the ultimate scope of that power.”); Solid Waste 
Agency of N. Cook Cty., 531 U.S. at 161 (“Permitting respondents to claim federal 
jurisdiction over ponds and mudflats falling within the Migratory Bird Rule would also result 
in a significant impingement of the States’ traditional and primary power over land and water 
use.”). 
97 Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 738; Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cty., 531 U.S. at 174. 
98 See ENVTL. L. INST., STATE WETLAND PROTECTION: STATUS, TRENDS, AND MODEL 
APPROACHES 13 (2008) (mapping state wetlands protection programs, and showing many 
states where the only protection comes from federal programs). Many states have also chosen 
to affect stream and wetland policy by using their influence within the 404 permitting 
process. See also, Owen, supra note 13, at 97–99, 101–05, 115 (describing mechanisms 
through which states can do this). 
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II.  THE LEGAL EVOLUTION 
 
At the outset of his plurality opinion in Rapanos, in a passage that 
foreshadowed his later discussion of federalism, Justice Scalia decried “the immense 
expansion of federal regulation of land use that has occurred under the Clean Water 
Act—without any change in the governing statute—during the past five Presidential 
administrations.”99 In one key sense, his charge was factually correct. Congress has 
not amended section 404 since 1977, yet there has been an immense expansion in 
the 404 program’s reach over the past six100 presidential administrations. This Part 
tells the legal story of that change. It begins with the emergence of modern water 
quality law, and with the Corps’s initial reluctance to extend that law beyond the 
boundaries of traditionally navigable waterways. In a second key phase of section 
404’s implementation history, regulatory practices changed dramatically—but not 
for little streams. Wetlands protection emerged as a national issue, and as a mission 
that the Corps gradually embraced, but stream protection still played second 
fiddle.101 Only during the most recent phase, which began during the late 1990s and 
continues through the present day, has stream protection begun its major shift.102 
 
A.  Statutory Origins and Regulatory Exemptions 
 
In 1972, Congress enacted the Clean Water Act, a statute that would quickly 
dominate the field of water quality protection in the United States.103 Congress did 
not write on a blank slate; state water quality law had begun to emerge decades 
earlier, and a series of less forceful federal statutes preceded the 1972 law.104 By 
1972, the Corps also had emerged as a player in the legal world of aquatic resource 
management.105 Its responsibilities under the Rivers and Harbors Act106 and the 
Refuse Act107 gave it some authority over the discharge of materials into traditionally 
navigable waterways, and the Corps had begun using that authority to restrain 
                                                      
99 Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 722.  
100 Justice Scalia wrote his opinion while George W. Bush was still in office. 
101 See infra notes 145–174 and accompanying text. 
102 Wetlands protections have also continued to evolve, see GARDNER, supra note 11 
(summarizing wetlands protection), but that evolution is not the direct focus of this Article. 
103 33 U.S.C.A. § 1251 et seq. (West 2016). Congress actually called the 1972 statute 
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, and it later became 
commonly known as the “Clean Water Act.”  
104 For detailed accounts of the Clean Water Act’s predecessors and legislative history, 
see William L. Andreen, The Evolution of Water Pollution Control in the United States – 
State, Local, and Federal Efforts, 1789-1972: Part I, 22 STAN. ENVTL. L. J. 145 (2003); 
William L. Andreen, The Evolution of Water Pollution Control in the United States – State, 
Local, and Federal Efforts, 1789-1972: Part II, 22 STAN. ENVTL. L. J. 215 (2003). 
105 See Sam Kalen, Commerce to Conservation: The Call for a National Water Policy 
and the Evolution of Federal Jurisdiction over Wetlands, 69 N.D. L. REV. 873, 881–86 
(1993). 
106 33 U.S.C.A. § 403 (West 2016). 
107 33 U.S.C.A. § 407 (West 2016). 
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pollution.108 But the 1972 legislation transformed the field by adding much stronger 
teeth to previous laws, setting forth the primary permitting programs through which 
water quality protection would be implemented, and defining the responsibilities of 
the Corps and the EPA.109 
One key component of the 1972 legislation was a regulatory program for 
discharges of dredged or fill material into waters of the United States. That program 
arises from the interplay of two statutory sections: 301, which prohibits unpermitted 
discharges of pollutants; and 404, which allows discharges of dredged or fill material 
if the discharging entity obtains, and complies with, a permit.110 Section 301 creates 
the prohibition, in other words, and section 404 creates a conditional, permit-based 
exception. The Corps and the EPA jointly administer the 404 program, with the 
Corps completing the day-to-day work of permit issuance, and with most of that 
work taking place at district and field offices across the country.111  
  
                                                      
108 Id. 
109 See Summary of the Clean Water Act, EPA, http://www2.epa.gov/laws-
regulations/summary-clean-water-act [https://perma.cc/3D4C-TC4L] (last updated Sept. 8, 
2016). 
110 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1311, 1344 (West 2016). 
111 See Owen, supra note 13, at 80–92. 
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Table 1: Roles of Federal and State Agencies in Implementing Clean Water Act 
Section 404 (a Partial Sampling)112 
 
  
                                                      
112 The Corps and the EPA entries on this table are pasted directly from the EPA’s 
website, as are the first two bullets for the Fish and Wildlife Service entry. Section 404 Permit 
Program, EPA, http://water.epa.gov/lawsregs/guidance/cwa/dredgdis/ [https://perma.cc/D4 
DW-NTTK] (last updated Mar. 3, 2016). I have written the remaining bullets. 
U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers 
• Administers day-to-day program, 
including individual and general permit 
decisions; 
• Conducts or verifies jurisdictional 
determinations; 
• Develops policy and guidance; and 
• Enforces Section 404 provisions. 
U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency 
• Develops and interprets 
policy, guidance, and environmental criteria 
used in evaluating permit applications; 
• Determines scope of geographic 
jurisdiction and applicability of exemptions; 
• Approves and oversees State and Tribal 
assumption; 
• Reviews and comments on individual 
permit applications; 
• Has authority to prohibit, deny, or restrict 
the use of any defined area as a disposal site 
(Section 404(c)); 
• Can elevate specific cases (Section 
404(q)); 
• Enforces Section 404 provisions. 




for marine or 
diadromous species) 
• Evaluates impacts on fish and wildlife of 
all new Federal projects and Federally 
permitted projects, including projects subject 
to the requirements of Section 404 (pursuant 
to the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act); 
• Elevates specific cases or policy issues 
pursuant to Section 404(q); and 
• Consults on projects that might adversely 
impact threatened or endangered species. 
State environmental 
regulatory agencies 
• Issue Clean Water Act section 401 
certifications, which certify that projects will be 
consistent with state water quality standards. 
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Almost immediately, questions emerged about which waters the new regulatory 
program encompassed.113 Congress had prohibited unpermitted discharges of 
pollutants into “navigable waters,” a phrase that, in traditional water law usage, 
encompassed waterways that were navigable for commercial purposes.114 But 
Congress then defined “navigable waters” as “the waters of the United States”—a 
seemingly more expansive definition.115 The EPA initially took a broad view of that 
language, but the Corps disagreed.116 It construed its jurisdiction as extending only 
to traditionally navigable—navigable-in-fact, in Clean Water Act jargon—
waterways.117 Smaller streams and isolated wetlands, according to the Corps, fell 
outside the program’s scope.118 
That narrow view reflected years of agency history and culture. Despite a few 
recent forays into the field, the Corps was not really an environmental regulatory 
agency—at least, not yet. Its historic purpose had been to promote navigation and to 
build waterworks, and it had often done so at great environmental cost.119 Hardly 
any biologists worked for the agency, which was staffed primarily with engineers 
and run by military officers.120 In an interview, a retired Fish and Wildlife Service 
                                                      
113 See Kalen, supra note 105, at 891–94. 
114 See 33 U.S.C.A. § 1311 (West 2016). To put the point more precisely, Congress 
prohibited unpermitted discharges, id., and the definition of discharge encompassed “any 
addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source.” 33 U.S.C.A. § 1362(12) 
(West 2016). For the classic explanation of “navigable waters,” see The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 
557, 563 (1870) (“[T]hey are navigable in fact when they are used, or are susceptible of being 
used, in their ordinary condition, as highways for commerce . . . .”). 
115 33 U.S.C.A. § 1362(7) (West 2016). 
116 See Thomas Addison & Timothy Burns, Comment, The Army Corps of Engineers 
and Nationwide Permit 26: Wetlands Protection or Swamp Reclamation?, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 
619, 628 (1991) (describing “dramatically different positions”). 
117 Permits for Activities in Navigable Waters or Ocean Waters, 39 Fed. Reg. 12,115, 
12,119 (April 3, 1974) (defining “navigable waters” as “those waters of the United States 
which are subject to the ebb and flow of the tide, and/or are presently, or have been in the 
past, or may be in the future susceptible for use for purposes of interstate or foreign 
commerce”); Permits for Activities in Navigable Waters or Ocean Waters, 38 Fed. Reg. 
12,217 (May 4, 1973). 
118 See Addison & Burns, supra note 116, at 628–29. 
119 See MARC REISNER, CADILLAC DESERT 169–213 (revised ed. 1993). 
120 See Telephone Interview with Retired Army Corps Dist. Chief (Sept. 9, 2014). The 
former chief described the culture of that era, and subsequent changes, at some length: 
 
Back in those Paleozoic days when the Corps had just begun hiring biologists and 
oceanographers and environmental scientists, back in the early to mid-70s, things 
were hugely different. . . . Initially, the Corps of Engineers didn’t really know 
what to do with biologists and environmental scientists. It was a culture dominated 
by engineers and military commanders. And the engineers are . . . I guess they’re 
not entirely monolithic, but engineers are often non-verbal, linear-type thinkers, 
A leads to B leads to C leads to solution, not prone to discussing all the other 
ramifications, necessarily, and the other influences and, well, how does this affect 
what we did on that project, and vice versa. . . . We sort of developed our own 
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(FWS) staff member described the resulting mentality: “They were old school Corps 
of Engineers, damn the torpedoes, we’re going to issue permits. We can’t let these 
lowly fish stand in our way . . . . [I]t was almost like the developers were their clients 
and their duty was to issue permits, and they just steamrolled them.”121 Regulating 
discharges that might impede navigation fit with the agency’s traditional purpose 
and expertise, particularly if, by occupying that role, the agency could keep the EPA 
from assuming exclusive authority within part of the Corps’s traditional domain.122 
But protecting small streams and wetlands did not. 
The Corps’s narrow conception of its Clean Water Act jurisdiction turned out 
to be short-lived. A federal court decision compelled a more expansive 
understanding,123 and in 1975, the Corps issued interim regulations defining its 
jurisdiction more broadly.124 It did so grudgingly. In a press release describing the 
new regulations, the Corps critiqued what it had just done in terms just a few 
adjectives short of those used by Speaker Boehner and other modern-day critics.125 
And at least some Corps staff doubted the longevity of the new rules. According to 
one article, a consultant helping with the new regulations was told he should not 
                                                      
culture by necessity, since we were initially sort of sequestered and ignored. It 
took me three years with the Corps before I got my very first promotion, 
something that’s completely unheard of now. And we were literally told, at one 
point, biologists and oceanographers were a dime a dozen. This was by our 
personnel director. We weren’t exactly made to feel at home. So compared to that, 
the situation has changed radically.  
 
Id. 
121 Telephone Interview with Retired FWS Staff Member (Aug. 26, 2014). A longtime 
EPA staff member put the point a bit more gently: 
 
The issues that we were speaking to, and still speak to in terms of why a particular 
filling activity might have an ecological impact, weren’t . . .  again, not speaking 
negatively, but weren’t within the wheelhouse of the engineers that were issuing 
permits at the time, years ago at the Corps. In terms of, they didn’t have the 
academic background and the understanding, and to some degree, attachment for 
that . . . contemplating those sorts of issues.  
 
Telephone Interview with EPA Staff Member (Sep. 4, 2014). 
122 See Addison & Burns, supra note 116 at 624 (repeatedly discussing, and critiquing, 
the Corps’s culture). 
123 Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685, 686 (D. D.C. 1975) 
(ordering the 1974 regulations revoked and rescinded). 
124 Permits for Activities in Navigable Waters or Ocean Waters, 40 Fed. Reg. 31320 
(July 15, 1975). 
125 See Addison & Burns, supra note 116, at 629 (“Simultaneously, however, the Corps 
issued a press release asserting that the decision would force it to require permits for ‘the 
rancher who wants to enlarge his stock pond, or the farmer who wants to deepen an irrigation 
ditch or plow a field, or the mountaineer who wants to protect his land against stream 
erosion.’”). 
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work too hard, because Congress would soon make the whole problem go away.126 
But Congress did no such thing. Its 1977 Clean Water Act amendments retained a 
broad definition of Clean Water Act jurisdiction, and that statutory language remains 
governing law today.127 
But even if the courts and Congress had rejected the Corps’s narrow conception 
of its jurisdiction, that rejection did not put an end to the geographically narrow 
scope of protections. In 1975 interim regulations, and again in 1977 final 
regulations, the Corps drew a sharp distinction between waters that might be 
jurisdictional and waters where impacts would actually be meaningfully 
regulated.128 Those regulations defined the waters of the United States to include 
“the entire length of rivers and streams.”129 But the Corps also established a cutoff 
point beyond which no additional permitting process would be required, and 
waterways could simply be filled, even though the waters might be jurisdictional.130 
For streams, that cutoff point occurred where the waterway had an annual average 
flow of less than five cubic feet per second.131 And to accommodate activities in arid 
areas, where infrequent but heavy flows might raise the averages, the Corps’s staff 
could use the point at which median flows reached five cubic feet per second as the 
regulatory cutoff, meaning that all but the largest perennial streams in arid regions 
would fall outside the reach of most regulatory constraints.132 The Corps did 
establish standardized general permits133—some of which would eventually 
                                                      
126 Id. at 632. 
127 Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (1977); see Kalen, 
supra note 105, at 897–905. 
128 Regulatory Programs of the Army Corps of Engineers, 42 Fed. Reg. 37,122, 31,729 
(July 19, 1977) (“We emphasize that, the ‘headwaters’ concept used in this new regulation 
is the point on the stream above which individual or general permits ordinarily will not be 
required. It is not to be construed as the point beyond which a stream ceases to be a water of 
the United States. . . .”). 
129 Id. at 31,129. 
130 Id. The regulations stated, in key part: 
 
We have responded to these concerns and criticisms by: (1) Including the entire 
length of rivers and streams in our definition of waters of the United States; (2) 
utilizing the “headwaters” ‘concept to establish the point on the stream below 
which an individual or general permit will be required to discharge dredged or fill 
material; (discharges above headwaters are being permitted through the issuance 
today of a nationwide permit which is discussed in greater detail below); and (3) 




132 See id. (“This approach more realistically represents normal base flows of such 
streams.”). 
133 A general permit, in the parlance of environmental law, is a permit that provides 
blanket authorization to a particular class of activities, so long as permit holders comply with 
a standardized set of permit conditions. See Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369, 
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coalesce into something known as Nationwide Permit 26—providing some legal 
cover for these fills, but the permits established only limited and largely hortatory 
requirements, and did not even include reporting obligations.134 Consequently, in 
some districts, any stream that a Corps field scientist could jump across—that was a 
shorthand field test for the regulatory boundary—could be filled at will.135 
In part because the Corps did not establish reporting requirements, it is difficult 
to know just how many streams were filled under this blanket authorization.136 But 
any realistic estimate would be large. As subsequent studies have revealed, little 
streams make up most of our river and stream miles.137 They also tend to get in the 
way of people’s activities, and they are fairly easy to fill. And we know from later 
studies that a wide variety of human activities tend to obliterate small streams.138 In 
all likelihood, much of that obliteration happened in full compliance with the 1977 
                                                      
1380–82 (D.C. Cir. 1977). A recent Corps/EPA study summarizes its different permit types 
as follows: 
 
Individual Permit: issued after a case-specific evaluation and a determination that the 
proposed activity is not contrary to the public interest 
• Standard Permit: permit that authorizes a specific activity after issuing a public 
notice to solicit comments and conducting a public interest review and other required 
analyses. 
• Letter of Permission: permit issued after conducting an abbreviated processing 
procedure, including coordination with federal and state agencies, and making a 
public interest determination. 
 
General Permits: authorize activities that are similar in nature and cause only minimal 
individual and cumulative adverse environmental impacts 
• Nationwide Permit: general permit issued by Corps Headquarters, to authorize 
activities across the country 
• Regional General Permit: general permit issued by a District Engineer to 
authorize categories of activities within a specific geographic area 
• Programmatic General Permit: general permit issued by a District Engineer to 
authorize categories of activities regulated by another agency, to reduce duplication. 
 
INST. FOR WATER RES., THE MITIGATION RULE RETROSPECTIVE: A REVIEW OF THE 2008 
REGULATIONS GOVERNING COMPENSATORY MITIGATION FOR LOSSES OF AQUATIC 
RESOURCES 18 (2015). 
134 See Addison & Burns, supra note 116, at 632. 
135 Telephone Interview with EPA Staff Member (Sep. 19, 2014) (“Their test for five 
[cubic feet per second of flow] was whether they could jump over it or not. We never even 
got into ephemeral or intermittent.”). Other districts used the drainage area of the stream to 
calculate average annual flows. See 42 Fed. Reg. 37,122, 37129 (July 19, 1977) (describing 
this method). But while the process may have been more rigorous, the implications of the 
cutoff point were the same. 
136 See Addison & Burns, supra note 116, at 637–40 (discussing the lack of reporting 
requirements and the resulting information deficits). 
137 See supra notes 32–35 and accompanying text. 
138 See supra notes 75–86 and accompanying text. 
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rule and its descendants—and with Nationwide Permit 26 and its predecessors—and 
it probably occurred on a massive scale. 
This vignette also sheds some interesting light on current debates over 
jurisdiction. In his Rapanos opinion, Justice Scalia criticized the Corps and the EPA 
for allegedly excessive overzealous assertions of jurisdiction, implying that a 
creeping jurisdictional expansion was the key mechanism through which the 
agencies had accomplished their alleged regulatory overreach.139 The present 
debates over the Clean Water Rule reflect the same emphasis; the battle over 
jurisdiction, one would think, is where all the stakes lie.140 But the reality is quite 
different. Jurisdiction was already extensive four decades ago.141 What has changed 
most, and what matters just as much as the jurisdictional boundary itself, is what 
agencies do within their jurisdiction. And for little streams, in the initial years of 
Clean Water Act implementation, the Corps did not do much. 
That may sound scandalous. But the Corps’s minimalist approach reflected a 
more general reality of environmental law in the 1970s and 1980s. Those may have 
been the glory days of American environmental legislation, but implementing those 
laws was another matter. To meaningfully protect small streams, or to fulfill many 
of the other grand mandates of the 1970s statutes, would require applying regulatory 
constraints to a huge variety of actions, each of which might seem to contribute to 
larger environmental problems only in very incremental ways.142 And the 
professional infrastructure for implementing that kind of constraint was only 
beginning to exist. Environmental regulatory agencies with real authority were 
relatively new phenomena. Environmental lawyers were taking a shared crash 
course in a new area of law. And the environmental consulting industry, which 
eventually would help regulated industries comply with all their new mandates, was 
just beginning to emerge.143 More broadly, the nation as a whole was slowly, and 
painfully, coming to grips with the reality that environmental protection might not 
just mean imposing constraints on a few big polluters.144 If the Corps struggled, in 
                                                      
139 See supra notes 75–86 and accompanying text. 
140 See, e.g., Jeremy P. Jacobs & Annie Snyder, Mr. Clean Water Act Faces his Biggest 
Test, GREENWIRE (Sept. 30, 2015), http://www.eenews.net/gw/2015/09/30 
[https://perma.cc/MZ44-SXHF ] (quoting a Department of Justice lawyer who characterized 
the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121 
(1985), a case that empowered comparatively broad assertions of jurisdiction, as “really the 
peak of environmental law under the Clean Water Act. . . . Frankly, it’s been downhill 
since”).  
141 See supra notes 123–127 and accompanying text. 
142 See David Adelman, Environmental Federalism when Numbers Matter More than 
Size, 32 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 238, 240–41 (2014) (describing the importance of 
small sources to air quality regulation); Dave Owen, Critical Habitat and the Challenge of 
Regulating Small Harms, 64 FLA. L. REV. 141, 143–44 (2012) [hereinafter Owen, Critical 
Habitat] (noting the pervasiveness of these challenges). 
143 See Bernard Sinclair-Desgagne, The Environmental Goods and Services Industry, 2 
INT’L REV. OF ENVTL. & RESOURCE ECON. 69, 72 (2008) (describing historical development 
of the environmental goods and services industry). 
144 See, e.g., Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369, 1370–71, 1381–82 
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that historical moment, to become a regulatory champion for little streams, it should 
not be too hard to understand why. 
 
B.  The Wetlands Era 
 
Small streams were not the only landscape features that received little 
protection during the early years of the 404 program. Small wetlands also played 
second fiddle.145 By the early 1990s, however, wetland protection had emerged as 
one of environmental law’s highest-profile issues.146 With that emergence, the 
histories of wetland and stream protection began a dramatic, if temporary, 
divergence. 
In part, the changes came from the top. President Ronald Reagan’s hostility to 
environmental regulation was widely publicized—and, according to some 
commentators, well received by the Corps.147 But by 1988, presidential candidates 
were openly declaring their commitment to avoiding further wetland loss.148 George 
H.W. Bush’s commitment to a national “no net loss” policy has guided agency 
policy ever since. 
In the field, changes were occurring as well. To implement its new regulatory 
responsibilities, the Corps had begun hiring biologists.149 While the new staff 
members were marginalized at first, they gradually began to integrate into, and help 
transform, the agency’s culture.150 The Corps’s partner agencies—the FWS, the 
National Marine Fisheries Service, and state wetland regulators, in addition to the 
EPA—also were engaged in constant discussions with the Corps staff, and often 
                                                      
(D.C. Cir. 1977) (compelling a reluctant EPA to regulate stormwater discharges and other 
dispersed sources of water pollution); Adelman, supra note 142, at 258–60 (describing 
backlashes against federal air pollution controls). 
145 See Addison & Burns, supra note 116, at 644 (focusing on impacts to vernal pools). 
146 See Oliver A. Houck & Michael Rolland, Federalism in Wetlands Regulation: A 
Consideration of Delegation of Clean Water Act Section 404 and Related Programs to the 
States, 54 MD. L. REV. 1242, 1243 (1995) (“Wetlands regulation may be the most 
controversial issue in environmental law.”). 
147 See Addison & Burns, supra note 116, at 659. 
148 See J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Gaming the Past: The Theory and Practice of 
Historic Baselines in the Administrative State, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1, 29–35 (2011) (describing 
the “no net loss” policy’s history). 
149 See Telephone Interview with Army Corps Regulatory Dist. Chief (Aug. 25, 2014) 
(describing the transition, at his district office, from a small staff of technicians: “That has 
grown into a totally professional staff, biologists, engineers, environmental scientists of all 
different backgrounds. We’ve gone from 5 people to 32 so there’s organizationally there’s 
been a big change. And, like I said, I would venture to say that was pretty consistent 
nationally.”). 
150 See Telephone Interview with EPA Staff Member (Sept. 4, 2014) (“When biologists 
came on board, and we all grew from the perspective of staff credentials and knowledge, 
everyone seemed to have a better understanding and appreciation of why some of the things 
that filling and disturbing streams and wetlands . . . why that concerns us, and it was easier 
to collaborate because we had more common understanding of those issues.”). 
24 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 1 
pushed for more thorough and aggressive wetland protections.151 The resulting 
changes were fitful. Throughout much of the 1980s, those partner agencies reported 
persistent frustrations with the Corps’s indifference toward environmental 
protection.152 Even as late as the early 1990s, the Corps was still issuing pamphlets 
showing cartoons of smiling bulldozers filling wetlands.153 But change did come. As 
one former FWS staff member summarized the transition:  
 
a new regime came into [the Corps district he worked with] and they were 
just so much more personable, so much more sensitive to environmental 
issues. I mean I truly felt that the . . .  district regulatory folks and even the 
project planning folks to a large extent, really believed in the equal 
consideration for fish and wildlife that the Fish and Wildlife Coordination 
Act[154] called for. There were times when I felt like . . . my environmental 
arguments . . . may have been even a little heavier weight on the scale than 
the law calls for.155 
 
In addition to its culture, the Corps’s regulatory toolbox also evolved. Initially, 
the Corps’s reluctance to protect dispersed resources like wetlands and streams 
                                                      
151 Palmer Hough & Morgan Robertson, Mitigation Under Section 404 of the Clean 
Water Act: Where It Comes from, What It Means, 17 WETLANDS ECOLOGY & MGMT. 15, 
20–23 (2009) (describing efforts by the Fish and Wildlife Service and the EPA to make the 
Corps’s practices more protective); See id. (“[W]e evolved from arguing with each other over 
whether salt marshes and tidal wetlands were important to a point in today’s world where 
there’s no disagreement among the Corps, EPA, Fish and Wildlife Service, all the players 
about those sorts of things. The early days of this program involved a lot of education.”). 
152 See Hough & Robertson, supra note 151, at 21 (quoting an EPA staff member: “The 
Corps regularly ignores a determination of significant degradation for individual and 
cumulative effects. This is the major cause of continuing wetland losses.”). 
153 Addison & Burns, supra note 116, at 663. 
154 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 661–666c (West 2016). The Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act 
requires federal agencies that are authorizing or carrying out alterations of water bodies to 
coordinate with agencies responsible for wildlife in those waterways. Id. § 662(a). 
155 Telephone Interview with Retired Fish and Wildlife Serv. Staff Member (Aug. 26, 
2014). He also noted that he viewed the Corps district he worked with as distinctive. Id. But 
many longtime Corps staff members from different districts described similar changes. For 
example: 
 
[W]hen I started, the principal . . . responsibility of our program was really to look 
at navigation, to look at the impacts of construction activities on navigation. It 
wasn’t until the mid-seventies with the advent of the Clean Water Act and new 
regulations that came out in response to that, where we got heavily involved in 
environmental concerns. And now navigation only plays a very small part of what 
we evaluate. It’s primarily now an environmental program. So there’s been a big 
change in the culture over the years in the focus of the Corps. 
 
Telephone Interview with Regulatory Dist. Chief (Aug. 25, 2014). 
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stemmed partly from manpower concerns.156 The Corps simply did not have the 
staff, it argued, to keep track of so many little aquatic features.157 But the agency 
gradually found better ways to provide protection while managing the manpower 
strains inherent in governing numerous, widely dispersed resources. Increasingly, it 
issued general permits—like Nationwide Permit 26—that provided blanket 
authorization for certain classes of activities, so long as the permittees complied with 
specific conditions and best management practices.158 And some of those conditions 
and best management practices generated real and meaningful environmental 
protection.159 By streamlining permitting for more minor activities, general permits 
also allowed the regulatory program’s staff—which had grown since the 1970s—to 
focus on more significant activities.160  
In addition to developing new permitting approaches for wetland fills, the 
Corps also turned to new ways to compensate for the resulting impacts. During the 
1980s and 1990s, the Corps increasingly required permit recipients to provide 
compensatory mitigation for wetland impacts.161 Compensatory mitigation meant 
creating new wetlands, or restoring, enhancing, or preserving existing ones, to offset 
the impacts of permitted wetland fills.162 Sometimes the permit recipient itself would 
provide the compensation. The Corps also allowed permit recipients to pay impact 
fees into third party funds, which would then be used to pay for wetland protection, 
or to private businesses that had already created, restored, or enhanced wetlands 
somewhere else, and now had wetland credits to sell.163 By the early 2000s, the 
former approach, known as an “in-lieu fee program,” and the latter, known as 
“mitigation banking,” were both available in many parts of the country.164 By most 
accounts, compensatory mitigation was initially a debacle; far too often the restored 
or created wetlands turned out to be poor substitutes for the natural wetlands that 
had been destroyed.165 But the Corps, the EPA, and their regulatory and private 
                                                      
156 Addison & Burns, supra note 116, at 655. 
157 See id. 
158 Id.; see also Owen, supra note 13, at 97–99 (describing the development of general 
permits). 
159 See Owen, supra note 13, at 98–99 (describing the use of general permits to increase 
stringency).  
160 See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Regulatory Dist. Chief (Sept. 3, 2014) (“If we 
don’t necessarily have to look at every small project . . . that allows my project managers to 
really focus on those projects that might have more than a minimal environmental effect.”). 
161 See Hough & Robertson, supra note 151, at 18. 
162 See id. at 23–24. 
163 See Compensatory Mitigation for Losses of Aquatic Resources, 73 Fed. Reg. 19,594, 
19,594–95 (Apr. 10, 2008) (explaining different approaches to compensatory mitigation). 
164 See ENVTL. L. INST., THE STATUS AND CHARACTER OF IN-LIEU FEE MITIGATION IN 
THE UNITED STATES 17–18 (2006) (listing programs by state); JESSICA WILKINSON & JARED 
THOMPSON, 2005 STATUS REPORT ON COMPENSATORY MITIGATION IN THE UNITED STATES 
2 (2006). 
165 See COMM. ON MITIGATING WETLAND LOSSES, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, 
COMPENSATING FOR WETLAND LOSSES UNDER THE CLEAN WATER ACT 45 (2001) (finding 
pervasive inadequacies); GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CORPS OF ENGINEERS DOES NOT HAVE 
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partners were gradually learning from their mistakes. Though the empirical record 
is far from thorough, some more recent studies suggest—and agency staff 
emphatically asserted—that wetlands mitigation has improved.166 
The changes that began in the eighties and nineties, in short, were substantial.167 
But they were also focused primarily on wetlands.168 For decades, Nationwide 
Permit 26 remained the primary nationwide permit for stream impacts, and it 
addressed the smallest of those streams largely by excluding them from regulatory 
protection.169 Compensatory mitigation was also focused on wetlands; the streams 
                                                      
AN EFFECTIVE OVERSIGHT APPROACH TO ENSURE THAT COMPENSATORY MITIGATION IS 
OCCURRING 26 (2005) (critiquing the Corps’s governance of mitigation). In my interviews, 
Corps staff never denied that early mitigation practices had been poor. See, e.g., Telephone 
Interview with Regulatory Dist. Chief (Sept. 16, 2014) (“[T]here’s an old school, I was 
trained that way so I understand it, you know it’s just a reluctance to lay a lot of heavy 
mitigation.”); Telephone Interview with Regulatory Dist. Chief (Nov. 20, 2014) (“[W]hen 
we first started doing wetland mitigation, it was on-site, one-to-one, and for the most part 
failing miserably.”). 
166 See, e.g., Tammy Hill et al., Compensatory Stream and Wetland Mitigation in North 
Carolina: An Evaluation of Regulatory Success, 51 ENVTL. MGMT. 1077, 1089 (2013). One 
agency biologist summarized the change:  
 
As we’ve learned more about wetlands, their functions, the program has morphed 
over time, gotten more prescriptive. We’ve learned what doesn’t work versus 
those that do. There’s a lot of things that we didn’t require ten, twenty years ago 
that we do today. The level of detail, types of things that work for mitigation 
versus those that don’t. Back in the day somebody may have said, “Well I’m just 
gonna go create some wetlands” and we’d say “OK, here’s your permit” without 
any level of detail of what you’re gonna do and how you’re gonna do it, what your 
success is. If it didn’t work, then, “ok, well no big deal.” Today it’s a much tighter 
mindset. The level of detail is significantly higher. The way that we interpret the 
law . . . and what levels of information we need today are much tighter, and we 
don’t let things go or just kind of write them off because they’re not that important. 
 
Telephone Interview with Regulatory Branch Chief (Sept. 5, 2014). 
167 See generally Hough & Robertson, supra note 151 (chronicling these changes). 
168 One district chief summarized that evolution: 
 
[B]ack in the 80’s . . . most of our work at that time was on the rivers. It wasn’t 
until ‘88 I think, President Bush, the first Bush, said, “no net loss.” The program 
started evolving towards wetlands at that point. And then the first lawsuit for coal 
was in ‘98, Robertson versus Bragg. . . . And that was about stream impacts, and 
really the program wasn’t positioned very well at that time to deal with stream 
impacts. We didn’t have stream assessment methodologies. There was nothing in 
place other than some rough ratio, 1:1 replacement, that kind of thing, because the 
whole program was geared to wetlands. . . . 
 
Telephone Interview with Regulatory Dist. Chief (Sept. 16, 2014). 
169 See supra notes 134–138 and accompanying text. 
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that were lost, as one retired Corps district chief explained to me, “were just lost.”170 
Even when the Corps did require compensatory mitigation for stream impacts, it 
generally let wetland restoration serve as compensation.171 It did so in part because 
regulators lacked clear ideas about how stream mitigation would even be done; 
scientific research on the subject was minimal, and permits and regulatory guidance 
documents were often ambiguous, or just silent, about streams.172 In policy 
discussions, the rhetorical emphasis on wetlands was even more pronounced. 
Politicians simply did not talk about a “no net loss” policy for streams, and 
environmental lawyers came to think of the 404 program as a wetlands program.173 
Indeed, that framing lingers today. Environmental law articles (including several 
that I have written), treatises, and casebooks still routinely identify section 404 
solely with wetlands protection, as though regulatory protection of streams simply 
did not exist.174 
 
C.  The Emergence of Stream Protection 
 
One might expect the story to end there. Just two years after George H.W. 
Bush’s “no net loss pledge,” Congress enacted the 1990 Clean Air Act 
Amendments175 and the Oil Pollution Act,176 but little additional legislation 
followed; those statutes are widely hailed as the last significant environmental 
legislation to emerge from the United States’ federal government.177 And just four 
years after that, midterm elections handed both congressional chambers to a cohort 
                                                      
170 Telephone Interview with Retired Regulatory Dist. Chief (Sept.12, 2014). 
171 See id. In response to a question about how stream mitigation was done two decades 
ago, he said, “we probably accepted wetland restoration or enhancement.” When I followed 
up by mentioning that other staff had told me that no mitigation was required at all, he said, 
“That’s quite possible as well. . . .” Id. 
172 See id. (“[Q]uite frankly, we probably didn’t have the technical expertise back in the 
early nineties to say to somebody, ‘here is what we want you to do in this channel to make it 
better.’ We just didn’t know.”); Telephone Interview with Retired N.C. Dep’t of Envtl. 
Quality Emp. (Sept. 9, 2015) (noting that state and federal regulatory documents were 
ambiguous in their treatment of stream impacts).  
173 See Telephone Interview with Senior Corps Staff Members (Nov. 17, 2014) (“For a 
long time 404 was viewed as a ‘wetland protection program.’”). 
174 See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
175 Clean AirAct, Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (codified 
at various portions of 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7401–7671q (West 2016)). 
176 Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-380, 104 Stat. 484 (amending multiple 
parts of the U.S. Code). 
177 See RICHARD LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 125–26 (2004). 
The most prominent exception to this generalization is the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery 
Conservation and Management Act, which became much more environmentally protective 
through amendments in 1996 and in 2007. See PEW CHARITABLE TR. & OCEAN 
CONSERVANCY, THE LAW THAT’S SAVING AMERICAN FISHERIES: THE MAGNUSON-STEVENS 
FISHERY CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT ACT 12 (2013) (summarizing changes to the 
statute). 
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of conservative Republicans, many of whom were fixated on rolling back 
environmental laws.178 Environmental law’s era of trench warfare had begun, and 
some of that warfare clearly continues to the present day. But the late 1990s also 
brought the beginning of another change, and eventually, it would lead to a 
transformation—which is still ongoing—in the legal regime for stream protection. 
 
1.  Changing Permit Thresholds 
 
Though that transformation was significant, it has manifested itself in ways that 
might initially seem mundane. There was no major new statute, nor any grand 
presidential proclamation that led to the shift toward stream protections. Though the 
courts have been involved, their role—outside of the central Appalachian coalfields, 
which I discuss below in more depth—also has been minor.179 Instead, the heart of 
the transformation has been a shift toward increasingly protective permitting 
thresholds for stream impacts. Many regulatory systems have thresholds below 
which no regulatory constraint exists, and they also often have a second, and higher, 
set of thresholds below which regulatory processes exist but are streamlined.180 For 
streams, both of these thresholds have been getting lower and lower. 
The most salient indicator of this trend is the evolution of the Army Corps’s 
nationwide general permits. These permits provide standardized conditions under 
which large numbers of projects can be approved.181 And while general permits in 
theory should cover only projects that have minimal environmental consequences,182 
tens of thousands of projects proceed under general permits every year,183 and the 
collective environmental effects of at least some of those projects can be 
substantial.184 The economics of general permits are also important. They are faster 
                                                      
178 See LAZARUS, supra note 177, at 128–29. 
179 See infra notes 200–219 and accompanying text (discussing coal cases). My research 
assistants and I ran multiple searches for cases involving stream protection and found few 
cases that did not involve either coal mining or jurisdictional determinations. 
180 See Owen, supra note 142, at 189–90 (discussing the prevalence of these thresholds 
and the challenges associated with setting them). 
181 See Owen, supra note 13, at 82. For broad discussion of the distinctions between 
individual and general permits, see Eric Biber & J.B. Ruhl, The Permit Power Revisited: The 
Theory and Practice of Regulatory Permits in the Administrative State, 64 DUKE L.J. 133, 
155–64 (2014). 
182 See 33 U.S.C.A. § 1344(e)(1) (West 2016) (allowing nationwide permits “if the 
Secretary determines that the activities in such category are similar in nature, will cause only 
minimal adverse environmental effects when performed separately, and will have only 
minimal cumulative adverse effect on the environment.”). 
183 See RYAN W. TAYLOR, FEDERALISM OF WETLANDS 88, 94 (2013) (finding that the 
Corps issued over eighty-five thousand permits per year, and that 95% of them were general 
permits). 
184 See Palmer & Hondula, supra note 27, at 10,557–59 (documenting massive impacts 
from mountaintop removal mining). In comments on a draft of this paper, Corps staff noted 
their agency’s disagreement with a claim that the nationwide permits authorize significant 
environmental impacts. I am in no position to contest their position with respect to the full 
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and cheaper to obtain than individual permits, and regulated entities therefore 
usually prefer to use general permits.185 For all of these reasons, the thresholds for 
these permits are quite important. And in multiple ways, those thresholds have 
become more protective.186 The changes have affected all types of aquatic resources, 
but they have been particularly pronounced for streams. 
As late as the mid-1990s, Nationwide Permit 26 still was the most important 
permit for stream fills, and it still was quite permissive. Until 1996, a permittee could 
fill ten acres of wetlands or small streams under the permit, and could fill one acre 
without even providing any advance notice.187 As a practical matter, that meant 
permittees could fill particularly small streams nearly at will; if a stream averages 
eight feet wide, one could fill 5,445 feet—more than a mile—without hitting even 
that one-acre notice threshold.188 But in 1996, in response to widespread criticism 
and litigation, the Corps lowered the permit eligibility limit to five hundred linear 
feet, and the agency also began a process of phasing Nationwide Permit 26 out 
entirely.189 In 2000, several activity-specific permits replaced Nationwide Permit 26, 
and each had a three-hundred-foot linear limit.190 In 2002, the Corps softened that 
limit by giving district engineers the ability to waive the three-hundred-foot 
threshold.191 But in 2007, the limits again grew tighter. This time the Corps 






                                                      
suite of nationwide permits, but I do think the evidence is quite compelling that Nationwide 
Permits 21 and 26 did authorize environmental impacts that by any reasonable definition 
were substantial and significant. See id.; supra notes 136–138 and accompanying text 
(describing activities authorized under Nationwide Permit 26). 
185 See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 721 (2006) (citing costs, which also 
have large disparities); CLAUDIA COPELAND, THE ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS’ NATIONWIDE 
PERMITS PROGRAM: ISSUES AND REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS 2 (2012) (citing substantial 
differences in processing times). 
186 Hough & Robertson, supra note 151, at 18 (“There has been a trend toward applying 
NWPs to ever-smaller impacts.”). 
187 Final Rule for Nationwide Permit Program Regulations and Issue, Reissue, and 
Modify, 56 Fed. Reg. 59,110, 59,113–14, 59,125–26, 59,143 (Nov. 22, 1991) (to be codified 
at 33 C.F.R. pt. 330) (explaining the thresholds for protection). 
188 An acre is 43,560 square feet, and 43,560 divided by eight is 5,445. 
189 See Final Notice of Issuance, Reissuance, and Modification of Nationwide Permits, 
61 Fed. Reg. 65,874 (Dec. 13,1996); COPELAND, supra note 185, at 4 (describing Nationwide 
Permit 26’s slow demise); On Firm Ground, THE AMICUS JOURNAL, Sept. 30, 2000, at 43 
(describing the role of litigation in Nationwide Permit 26’s demise). 
190 See Final Notice and Issuance of Nationwide Permits, 65 Fed. Reg. 12,818, 12,889 
(Mar. 9, 2000). 
191 See Issuance of Nationwide Permits; Notice, 67 Fed. Reg. 2020, 2058–59 (Jan. 15, 
2002) (explaining the change). 
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three-hundred-foot limit, and it required pre-constructive notification for all uses of 
stream fill permits.192 Finally, in 2012, the Corps added requirements for interagency 
coordination prior to any waiver of the three-hundred-foot limit.193 
A simple hypothetical illustrates the importance of those changes. Suppose a 
developer wanted to build a shopping mall. Under the initial site plan, two hundred 
linear feet of perennial and intermittent streams (all with average annual flows below 
5 cubic feet per second) would be filled, along with an additional four hundred feet 
of ephemeral streams. In 1991, the whole project could have proceeded without the 
developer even providing preconstruction notification to the Corps.194 But by the 
late 2000s, the developer would no longer even be eligible (absent a written waiver) 
for a general permit.195 Instead, it would need to obtain an individual permit, which 
would mean not only a higher level of scrutiny under Clean Water Act sections 
401196 and 404, but also individualized review under the National Environmental 
Policy Act and, if threatened or endangered species are present, the Endangered 
Species Act.197 What once was a minimal regulatory process could now be quite 
rigorous. The developer might still proceed with the project, but it also might give 
serious thought to alternative project locations or site designs that would avoid, or 
at least reduce, stream fills.198 
                                                      
192 Reissuance of Nationwide Permits; Notice, 72 Fed. Reg. 11,092, 11,097 (Mar. 12, 
2007) 
193 See Reissuance of Nationwide Permits, 77 Fed. Reg. 10,184, 10,189 (Feb. 21, 2012). 
194 See Final Rule for Nationwide Permit Program Regulations and Issue, Reissue, and 
Modify, 56 Fed. Reg. 59,110, 59,113–14, 59,125–26, 59,143 (Nov. 22, 1991) (explaining 
the thresholds for protection). 
195 See Issuance of Nationwide Permits; Notice, 67 Fed. Reg. 2020, 2058–59 (Jan. 15, 
2002) (describing reasons for the waiver requirement). 
196 See 33 U.S.C.A. § 1341 (West 2016). Section 401 requires federal permit recipients 
whose projects involve a discharge to obtain a state certification that their activities will 
comply with state water quality standards. In other words, it gives states authority to deny 
authorization to, or impose conditions on, federal permits, including 404 permits. Id.  
197 See 42 U.S.C.A. §4332(C) (West 2016) (requiring environmental impact statements 
for “major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment . . .”); 
16 U.S.C.A. § 1536(a)(2) (West 2016) (requiring interagency consultation for federal agency 
actions that might adversely affect threatened or endangered species). The Corps also 
consults and completes NEPA compliance for general permits, but it does so on a 
programmatic basis rather than for each permit issued. See, e.g., NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES 
SERV., ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT SECTION 7 CONSULTATION BIOLOGICAL OPINION AND 
CONFERENCE BIOLOGICAL OPINION 2 (Nov. 24, 2014), http://www.usace.army.mil/Portals 
/2/docs/civilworks/nwp/2012/NWP404_BiOp_11-24-14.pdf [https://perma.cc/92J4-GGH2] 
(assessing “a national program of categories of activities” rather than “individual discharges 
authorized by one or more of these permits”). This saves individual recipients of general 
permits from needing to go through project-specific NEPA and ESA compliance—unless 
they also need a discretionary federal permit from another agency.  
198 See U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, DECISION DOCUMENT NATIONWIDE PERMIT 39, 
7, 23 (Feb. 13, 2012), http://www.usace.army.mil/Portals/2/docs/civilworks/nwp/2012/NW 
P_39_2012.pdf, [https://perma.cc/K97R-PLCV] (explaining these incentives); Biber & 
Ruhl, supra note 181, at 182–183 (discussing the incentives created by permitting 
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Table 2: Evolution of Permitting Requirements for Large-Scale Residential or 
Commercial Developments199 
 







































All projects All projects 
 
2.  Mountaintop Removal  
 
The evolution of development permits has many parallels,200 but for one type 
of stream impact, the changes have come later, more fitfully, and with much more 
conflict. For stream fills associated with surface coal mining, the regulatory 
evolution is sufficiently distinctive that it merits its own discussion.201 
The central Appalachians are rich in streams, aquatic biodiversity, and coal.202 
Miners have dug that coal for many years, and by the early 1990s, much of the 
readily accessible coal had been extracted, hauled away, and burned.203 To get at 
what remained, coal mining companies turned to mountaintop removal, which 
involves taking off mountaintops, extracting the coal beneath, recreating an 
imitation mountaintop with some of the removed rock, and depositing the leftover 
rubble in nearby headwater stream valleys.204 The effects upon streams were 
devastating.205 
                                                      
thresholds). 
199 I compiled this table by reviewing permitting requirements established in Federal 
Register documents for each of the listed years. 
200 See Hough & Robertson, supra note 151, at 18 (“There has been a trend toward 
applying NWPs to ever-smaller impacts.”). 
201 For a more detailed discussion of this evolution, see COPELAND, supra note 88. 
202 The central Appalachians are not the only coal-producing region in the country, nor 
are they the most important one. See U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Frequently Asked Questions: 
Which States Produce the Most Coal?, EIA.GOV, http://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.cfm?id 
=69&t=2 [https://perma.cc/FT6C-4CGJ] (last visited Aug. 23, 2016) (showing Wyoming in 
the lead, by a huge margin). But since the Appalachian states have been the center of conflicts 
between coal production and stream protection, and therefore are also the focus of this 
discussion. 
203 See COPELAND, supra note 88, at 1.  
204 Id. 
205 See Emily S. Bernhardt & Margaret A. Palmer, The Environmental Costs of 
Mountaintop Mining Valley Fill Operations for Aquatic Systems of the Central 
Appalachians, ANN. N.Y. ACAD. SCI., Mar. 2011, at 39, 44–49.  
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For years, the Corps and its fellow regulatory agencies did little to restrain the 
practice. Instead, the Corps routinely authorized stream fills under Nationwide 
Permit 21, which covered coal mines that were also regulated under the Surface 
Mining Control and Reclamation Act.206 Nationwide Permit 21 imposed only 
modest controls and had no upper threshold. Environmental groups argued—among 
other claims—that the Corps’s permits for valley fills were inconsistent with the 
Clean Water Act.207 District courts agreed, first with this argument and then with a 
series of others, and the groups won a succession of major litigation victories—only 
to see the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit set one decision after another 
aside.208 As late as 2008, mountaintop removals continued with little regulatory 
restraint, offset only by weak attempts at compensatory mitigation.209 
Yet even in the coalfields, the law of little streams is changing. As soon as it 
assumed office in 2009, the Obama Administration began reviewing both individual 
permits and broader practices.210 The EPA, the Corps, and the Office of Surface 
Mining announced that they would develop new policies for reviewing coal mining 
permits.211 General permits changed; the Corps first suspended Nationwide Permit 
21 for the six Appalachian coal-mining states, and then, when it reauthorized the 
permit, excluded valley fills from its coverage and added acreage and linear foot 
limitations.212 The EPA published new guidance designed to establish stricter 
environmental performance standards for mining-related permits, with the intended 
                                                      
206 See Issuance of Nationwide Permits; Notice, 67 Fed. Reg. 2020, 2081 (Jan. 15, 2002) 
(describing Nationwide Permit 21). 
207 See 33 U.S.C.A. § 1344(e)(1) (West 2016) (authorizing general permits only if the 
permitted activities “are similar in nature, will cause only minimal adverse environmental 
effects when performed separately, and will have only minimal cumulative adverse effect on 
the environment”). 
208 See Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 479 F. Supp. 2d 607, 
614 (S.D.W. Va. 2007) (issuing an injunction), rev’d, Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. v. Aracoma 
Coal Co., 556 F.3d 177, 186–87 (4th Cir. 2009); Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. v. Bulen, 410 F. 
Supp. 2d 450, 470–71 (S.D.W. Va. 2004) (enjoining the use of Nationwide Permit 21 in West 
Virginia), vacated in part, 429 F.3d 493, 496 (4th Cir. 2005); Kentuckians for the 
Commonwealth, Inc. v. Rivenburgh, 204 F. Supp. 2d 927, 946–47 (S.D.W. Va. 2002) 
(issuing an injunction), vacated, 317 F.3d 425, 430 (4th Cir. 2003); Bragg v. Robertson, 72 
F. Supp. 2d 642, 664 (S.D.W. Va. 1999) (issuing a permanent injunction), vacated, Bragg v. 
W. Va. Coal Mining Ass’n, 248 F.3d 275, 286 (4th Cir. 2001). In 2009, the plaintiffs finally 
won a victory in district court that was not reversed. Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. v. Hurst, 604 
F. Supp. 2d 860 (S.D.W. Va. 2009). 
209 See Palmer & Hondula, supra note 27, at 10,558. 
210 COPELAND, supra note 88, at 8–9. 
211 See Press Release, EPA, Obama Administration Takes Unprecedented Steps to 
Reduce Environmental Impacts of Mountaintop Coal Mining, Announces Interagency 
Action Plan to Implement Reforms (June 11, 2009), https://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress 
.nsf/3881d73f4d4aaa0b85257359003f5348/e7d3e5608bba2651852575d200590f23!OpenD
ocument [https://perma.cc/9PYC-HRUK]. 
212 COPELAND, supra note 88, at 11. 
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secondary consequence of limiting, if not entirely ending, valley fills.213 The EPA 
also actually vetoed one of the Corps’s individual permits for a major mountaintop 
removal mining project.214 Finally, and most recently, the Department of the Interior 
joined the reform movement by proposing new rules for protecting streams from 
surface mining.215 These administrative actions provoked more litigation,216 and 
again the plaintiffs—this time representing industry—succeeded before district 
courts, only to lose on appeal.217 So far the transition has not left anyone entirely 
satisfied. Environmental groups would prefer even stricter controls, while the 
industry decries the initiatives as part of the Obama Administration’s “war on 
coal.”218 But whether environmental protection of Appalachian coal country streams 
has evolved too much or too little, there is no doubt that it has changed.219 
These changes, like the changes to general permits for developments and other 
activities, may sound technical. But permits, though somewhat arcane, are the key 
                                                      
213 See COPELAND, supra note 88, at 12; Memorandum from Peter S. Silva & Cynthia 
Giles to Shawn Garvin, Gwendolyn Keyes Fleming, & Susan Hedman, Improving EPA 
Review of Surface Coal Mining Operations Under the Clean Water Act, the National 
Environmental Policy Act, and the Environmental Justice Executive Order (July 11, 2011) 
(on file with author).  
214 U.S. EPA, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS: SPRUCE MINE FINAL DETERMINATION, 
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-05/documents/final_spruce_404c_qa_01 
1311.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZDJ2-8GX5] (last visited Nov. 24, 2016). However, such vetoes 
are rare. See Michael C. Blumm & Elisabeth Mering, Vetoing Wetland Permits Under 
Section 404(c) of the Clean Water Act: A History of Inter-Federal Agency Controversy and 
Reform, 33 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 215, 222–23 (2015) (noting that this veto authority 
has been used only thirteen times). 
215 Stream Protection Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. 44,436, 44,439 (proposed July 27, 2015). 
216 As of this writing, the DOI Stream Protection Rule is not yet final, but political 
reactions suggest that when it is finalized, lawsuits will follow. 
217 Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. Jackson, 880 F. Supp. 2d 119, 124 (D.D.C. 2012), rev’d, 
Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. McCarthy, 758 F.3d 243 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (considering the EPA’s 
2011 guidance); Mingo Logan Coal Co. Inc. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 850 F. Supp. 2d 
133, 153 (D.D.C. 2012), rev’d, 714 F.3d 608, 609–11 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (considering the 
Spruce Mine permit veto). 
218 Nicholas Fandos, U.S. Proposes New Rules to Protect Streams from Coal Pollution, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 16, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/17/us/us-proposes-new-
rules-to-protect-streams-from-coal-pollution.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/Z6RY-QEX6]. 
219 One longtime Corps staff member, in responding to my question about what changes 
she had seen during her career, summarized this transition: 
 
Major environmental changes as protecting the environment. And if you said that 
to environmental groups they’d probably laugh but they don’t have the 
perspective of what the program was before all this started. I mean we are making 
a big difference in the areas when coal mining permits are issued in what goes 
back and what’s required and what’s being mitigated. None of that was being done 
before. . . . 
 
Telephone Interview with Army Corps Dist. Chief (Sept. 16, 2014). 
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mechanism through which broad statutory and regulatory mandates become specific, 
binding constraints.220 A change in permit coverage or terms therefore can be a very 
important shift. And with this particular set of changes, an enormous set of aquatic 
resources that once lacked meaningful regulatory protection now cannot be impacted 
without a permitting process. In the past few decades, water quality law has seen 
few, if any, changes that are more significant. 
 
3.  The Emergence of Stream Compensatory Mitigation 
 
These expansions in the scope of the permitting program will have only limited 
effects if the permits simply rubber stamp stream fills, as many permits once did. 
But stream protection has evolved in other important ways as well: permit 
requirements now are changing along with permit thresholds. One of the most 
important—and still ongoing—changes involves the emergence of compensatory 
mitigation requirements for stream impacts. 
 
(a)  The Prevalence of the Practice 
 
Even in the early 1990s, when compensatory mitigation for wetland impacts 
was becoming a standard practice, “that’s all that Corps of Engineers districts were 
mitigating,” as one retired district chief explained it.221 Impacts to streams were still 
occurring, and occurring on a widespread basis, but no one was attempting to 
compensate for those impacts by restoring or protecting streams somewhere else. 
Beginning in the late 1990s, however, that began to change.   
The change started humbly. In the mid-1990s, developers proposed to build 
Hanes Mall Boulevard, a commercial project in Winston-Salem, North Carolina.222 
Construction would necessitate placing a long length of stream in a culvert, and 
North Carolina state regulators were concerned about the impacts.223 But 
Nationwide Permit 26 established no constraint on the destruction of the stream, and 
the regulators saw little basis for restraint in existing state rules.224 Nor did regulators 
have clear ideas about how they might respond. “We knew we wanted to regulate 
streams,” one retired state employee told me, “but didn’t know how to do it.”225   
Even if regulators were unsure of their next step, a variety of factors were 
pushing toward the emergence of compensatory stream mitigation—and made North 
Carolina a particularly promising place for the new practice to emerge. Protecting 
water quality was, at the time, a salient political issue; a series of massive pollution 
spills and fish kills had spurred widespread and bipartisan interest in improving 
protection of the state’s waterways.226 The legislature and governor—the latter a 
                                                      
220 See Biber & Ruhl, supra note 181, at 155–56; Owen, supra note 13, at 99. 





226 Telephone Interview with N.C. State Univ. Scientists (Sept. 4, 2015). 
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Democrat, and the former containing a Democratic majority—were generally 
sympathetic to that public preference.227 But North Carolina also was in the midst of 
a real estate development boom, and few politicians or regulators wish to stand 
squarely in the way of economic growth.228 So some compromise was necessary. At 
a deeper level, the ideologies of environmental lawmaking were shifting, and 
regulatory approaches that leaned on market-like systems and private-sector actors 
were increasingly popular, even among environmental groups.229 In that political 
context, compensatory mitigation could offer something to everyone: environmental 
advocates got some preservation and restoration, developers got flexibility, and 
regulators could plausibly claim to be doing something other than resorting to 
traditional command-and-control regulation. It also did not hurt that North Carolina 
already had a robust wetland mitigation banking industry.230 Streams, then, could be 
a new frontier for an already-established business model. 
And so, the answer North Carolina regulators turned to was a compensatory 
mitigation requirement for streams. Using its authority under Clean Water Act 
section 401,231 North Carolina began requiring compensatory mitigation for any 
stream impacts over one hundred fifty feet in length.232 State regulators also learned 
that scientists at North Carolina State University, and also private-sector consultants, 
had begun developing new stream restoration techniques, and they used the 
emerging science to guide mitigation projects.233 The scientists, in turn, bolstered 
the state regulators’ positions by making the case that streams were worth protecting, 
and by arguing that compensatory mitigation was a possible way to provide that 
protection. Indeed, even years later, a leading EPA section 404 specialist 
emphasized to me the importance of “active academic communities educating us on 
the importance of streams.”234 Initially, the EPA was mildly supportive and the 
Corps, as the former North Carolina state employee described it, was “kind of 
                                                      
227 Id. 
228 See BROOKINGS INST., CTR. ON URBAN AND METRO. POL’Y, ADDING IT UP: GROWTH 
TRENDS AND POLICIES IN NORTH CAROLINA 11 (2000) (“North Carolina is developing 
phenomenal amounts of land.”). 
229 See Rebecca Lave, Neoliberal Confluences: The Turbulent Evolution of Stream 
Mitigation Banking in the US, in FIELDS OF KNOWLEDGE: SCIENCE, POLITICS AND PUBLICS 
IN THE NEOLIBERAL AGE POLITICAL POWER AND SOCIAL THEORY, VOLUME 27, 69–75 
(David J. Hess & Scott Frickel eds., 2014).  
230 Id. at 78 (describing the wetland mitigation banking industry and its ties to 
Congress). 
231 33 U.S.C.A. § 1341 (West 2016) (requiring state water quality certifications for 
federally-authorized projects that will discharge into waters of the United States). For 
discussion of how section 401 provides states with leverage over projects subject to the Corps 
permitting, see Owen, supra note 13, at 113–16. 
232 Hill et al., supra note 166, at 1078.  
233 Telephone Interview with Barbara Doll, Ph.D., P.E., Water Prot. & Restoration 
Specialist, Sea Grant N.C., N.C. State Univ., & Karen Hall, Ph.D., Extension Assistant 
Professor, Biological and Agric. Eng’g, N.C. State Univ. (Sept. 4, 2015). 
234 Telephone Interview with EPA staff members (Aug. 21, 2015) (emphasizing the role 
of “active academic communities educating us on the importance of streams”). 
36 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 1 
bemused.”235 But soon they came on board—legally, they had little choice—and 
stream mitigation became a more common practice.236   
It also spread beyond state boundaries. The mechanisms of that spread defy any 
simple summary; indeed, many of the Corps staff I spoke to were not entirely sure 
how stream mitigation went from a localized practice to a nationwide priority.237 
One academic study attributes the shift partly to the ideas (and seminars) of a few 
charismatic consultants, though the staff I spoke with did not emphasize that part of 
the story.238 The anecdotes they related instead suggested a process in which 
different Corps districts and states learned about stream mitigation through a 
gradual, largely uncoordinated process of interjurisdictional communication and 
imitation. But however that evolution occurred, some basic numbers illustrate the 
magnitude of the resulting changes. Even in North Carolina, a 2005 retrospective 
study of stream mitigation projects could find few pre-1999 projects to evaluate.239 
But by 2011, two hundred forty stream mitigation banks were in operation.240 The 
banks are concentrated in the southeastern United States, where stream mitigation 
originated and remains most prevalent, and there are other regions where the practice 
is still “in its infancy,” as one Corps staff member put it.241 But stream mitigation is 
by no means an exclusively southeastern phenomenon.242 
  
                                                      
235 Telephone Interview with Retired N.C. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality Emp. (Sept. 9, 2015). 
He summarized the Corps’s initial attitude as, “that’s interesting; we don’t know what you’re 
trying to do, but, okay. . . .” Id. Environmental groups and other state wetland regulators, he 
said, were similarly puzzled at first. Id.  
236 See Owen, supra note 13, at 104–05 (summarizing this evolution). 
237 See, e,g., Telephone Interview with Army Corps Headquarters Staff (Nov. 17, 2014). 
As one staff member explained to me: 
 
I don’t know that there is one, like, defining moment when the light bulb popped 
on and everybody said, man we need to start worrying about mitigating for 
streams. If you haven’t found it in your interviews I guess I would not be surprised 
that no one can really point you to a new focus or a new emphasis on the part of 
the Corps or anything that says, hey look, today we are really going to get serious 
about stream mitigation and everybody needs to start doing stream mitigation. 
 
Id. 
238 See Lave, supra note 229, at 83; see also David Malakoff, The River Doctor, 305 
SCI. 937, 939 (2004) (describing the influence of Dave Rosgen, a prominent and 
controversial stream restoration scientist). 
239 Hill et al., supra note 166, at 1078. 
240 Martin W. Doyle & F. Douglas Shields, Compensatory Mitigation for Streams 
Under the Clean Water Act: Reassessing Science and Redirecting Policy, 48 J. AM. WATER 
RESOURCES ASS’N 494, 495 (2012). 
241 Telephone Interview with Senior Corps Staff Member (Nov. 24, 2014) (describing 
New York and New England). “I think,” he added, “it kind of parallels the existence of banks, 
which [are] much more prevalent further south. . . .” Id. 
242 In-lieu, fee programs also fund stream restoration work, so my focus on mitigation 
banking credits almost certainly understates the full extent of the practice. 
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Figure 1: States Where Stream Mitigation Credits Were Available for Purchase, 
August 11–12, 2015243 
 
 
The practice also enjoyed increasing support from the Corps and the EPA 
headquarters. In 2002, the Corps’s headquarters issued a “regulatory guidance 
letter,” which specifically stated that no net loss should be a guiding principle for all 
aquatic resources, not just wetlands.244 And in a 2008 rulemaking, the Corps and the 
EPA provided further support for the emerging practice.245 The primary purpose of 
the 2008 rulemaking was to set new rules for compensatory mitigation, and the 
resulting regulations devote page after page to the operation of mitigation banks and 
                                                      
243 Compiled from data on the Corps’s RIBITS database, Aug. 11–12, 2015. These 
numbers include only credits that were actually for sale. Other banks had previously sold 
credits but had none presently on offer, or were developing credits for future sales. These 
numbers also do not include credits allocated to specific species, which is a common practice 
on the West Coast. 
244 U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, NO. 02-2. REGULATORY GUIDANCE LETTER: 
GUIDANCE ON COMPENSATORY MITIGATION PROJECTS FOR AQUATIC RESOURCE IMPACTS 
UNDER THE CORPS REGULATORY PROGRAM PURSUANT TO SECTION 404 OF THE CLEAN 
WATER ACT AND SECTION 10 OF THE RIVERS AND HARBORS ACT OF 1899 (Dec. 24, 2002) 
(“Districts should require compensatory mitigation projects for streams to replace stream 
functions where sufficient functional assessments are available. However, where functional 
assessment is not practical, mitigation projects for streams should generally replace linear 
feet of stream on a one-to-one basis.”); see Mark Sudol, A Note from Headquarters, AQUATIC 
RESOURCES NEWS, Spring 2003, at 1, 1 (“Compensatory mitigation has long been associated 
with impacts to wetlands however, as stated in RGL 02-02 and the 2002 NWPs, all impacts 
to waters of the U.S. should be mitigated.”). 
245 Compensatory Mitigation for Losses of Aquatic Resources, 73 Fed. Reg. 19,594 
(Apr. 10, 2008). 
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in-lieu fee programs.246 But the regulations apply to all waters of the United States, 
not just wetlands, and in the preamble, the Corps and the EPA acknowledged that 
they had considered, and rejected, arguments against requiring compensatory 
mitigation for streams.247 Even after this endorsement, the practice still is not 
prevalent in some regions, and the Corps’s nationwide permits still establish a 
stronger mandate for wetland mitigation than they do for streams.248 But while steps 
still remain, compensatory stream mitigation is becoming an increasingly prevalent 
practice—and requirement.249 
That requirement is also becoming increasingly standardized and rigorous. In 
the early years of compensatory mitigation, accounting practices were often loose, 
and guidance documents explaining how regulators should account for stream 
impacts were essentially nonexistent.250 That created problems; valuing stream and 
wetland impacts is no simple matter, and if valuation is handled poorly, the 
environment often comes out on the losing end of the deal.251 But in the past ten 
years, stream mitigation guidance documents have proliferated, and states and the 
Corps districts across the country now have guidance documents designed to bring 
some standards, rigor, and consistency to their stream mitigation efforts.252 Those 
documents also are evolving; some are now in their second or third iterations.253 
Substantial room for improvement remains; in my interviews, I never heard anyone 
claim to have mastered the art of stream mitigation.254 But the proliferation of 
guidance documents indicates, at the very least, that what once was a rare and 
geographically limited practice has now gone national and mainstream. 
                                                      
246 Id. 
247 Id. at 19,596–97 (explaining why stream mitigation would be required). 
248 See Reissuance of Nationwide Permits, 77 Fed. Reg. 10,184, 10,285 (Feb. 21, 2012) 
(mandating compensatory mitigation for all unavoidable wetland impacts over 1/10 acre in 
area, but leaving some stream mitigation requirements to the discretion of district engineers). 
In comments on a draft of this paper, Corps staff noted that some Corps districts have 
exercised that discretion and now require more stream protections that go beyond the 
nationwide permits’ baseline levels. 
249 See Lave et al., supra note 23, at 287. 
250 I was unable to find any such guidance documents from before 1997. 
251 For general discussion of these valuation challenges, see Dave Owen & Colin Apse, 
Trading Dams, 48 U.C.D. L. REV. 1043, 1097–99 (2014); James Salzman & J.B. Ruhl, 
Currencies and the Commodification of Environmental Law, 53 STAN. L. REV. 607, 622–30 
(2000). 
252 See ASS’N OF STATE WETLAND MANAGERS, Stream Mitigation Guidance, 
Procedures, Handbooks and Protocols, ASWM.ORG, http://www.aswm.org/wetland-
programs?catid=0&id=4878 [https://perma.cc/PZZ6-T7TY] (last visited Aug. 23, 2016) 
(listing and providing links to guidance documents).  
253 See Lave, supra note 229, at 77 (“Every regulatory jurisdiction in which I conducted 
interviews had either gone through a major revision of their stream mitigation guidelines in 
the previous three years to address concerns [about the effectiveness of earlier guidelines] or 
was in the process of doing so.”). 
254 See Telephone Interview with Regulatory Dist. Chief (Sept. 12, 2014) (“[I]t’s an 
evolving science, very evolving.”). 
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Figure 2: States Where Compensatory Stream Mitigation Guidance Exists255 
 
                                                      
255 Readers should also be aware of a few caveats about these maps. First, I compiled 
the chart by searching the Internet for guidance documents, and it is possible that some early 
guidance documents have vanished from the Internet and have not been cited elsewhere. 
Second, deciding what counts as a stream mitigation guidance document involves some 
judgment calls. Some documents address streams fairly briefly, while others cover them in 
elaborate detail, and another reviewer might draw the lines at a slightly different point. Third, 
the chart may understate the extent to which guidance is used, for some states and Corps 
districts are probably using guidance from other areas. Fourth and finally, some guidance 
documents are specific to regions—like an individual Corps district—whose boundaries do 
not align exactly with those of the states. 
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D.  Unfinished Work 
 
Because of all these changes, little streams have more legal protection now than 
they did fifteen years ago. More streams fall within the scope of regulatory coverage; 
the regulatory requirements protecting those streams are more rigorous; and those 
requirements also are becoming increasingly sophisticated. But that does not mean 
those streams, or the downstream waters that depend upon them, receive stringent 
levels of protection. There are two primary reasons why. First, the 404 program 
increasingly relies upon compensatory mitigation, and vigorous debates continue 
about how, and even whether, compensatory mitigation can be done well.256 The 
second reason is the 404 program’s narrow bounds. Ultimately, protecting streams 
requires protecting the landscapes from which they flow, and the 404 program, with 
its focus on direct filling of aquatic features, can reach those landscapes only to a 
limited extent.257   
 
1.  Mitigation Troubles 
 
Scientists who have studied stream mitigation generally have no objection to 
the increased scope of regulatory protection. Indeed, much of the scientific literature 
produced in the last eight years reads like a massive amicus brief, all designed to 
convince Justice Kennedy, who will likely cast the deciding vote in any future 
Supreme Court case on Clean Water Act jurisdiction, that a significant nexus really 
does connect small streams to downstream waters.258 But multiple studies have 
expressed concern about how effective mitigation practices actually are.   
The harshest assessments come from studies of Appalachian coal country. In 
2014, Margaret Palmer, a leading stream scientist, and Kelly Hondula reviewed data 
from dozens of mitigation sites in the southern Appalachians.259 By the measured 
standards of scientific prose, their assessment fairly seethes with outrage:  
 
[T]he assessment criteria and requirements for compliance in the projects 
reviewed do not meet basic scientific standards: they do not take 
measurements relevant to the factors of interest, they have conclusions 
inconsistent with the data, and are overall inadequate to assess the 
                                                      
256 Some of the most damning critiques are now aging. See, e.g., COMM. ON MITIGATING 
WETLAND LOSSES, supra note 165, at 138–40. However, recent studies—particularly those 
focused on stream mitigation—have found plenty of continuing problems. E.g., Doyle & 
Shields, supra note 240, at 500; Palmer & Hondula, supra note 27, at 10,554–58. 
257 See Margaret A. Palmer & J. David Allan, Restoring Rivers, 22 ISSUES IN SCI. & 
TECH. 40, 42 (2006) (“The primary reason why so many rivers and streams are still being 
degraded today is poor land stewardship.”). 
258 See, e.g., Alexander et al., supra note 46, at 56 (“The results also provide scientific 
information that potentially broadens understanding of the extent of Federal CWA 
jurisdiction in waters of the United States, a topic of continuing importance as illustrated by 
recent U.S. Supreme Court cases.”). 
259 Palmer & Hondula, supra note 27, at 10,552. 
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outcomes required by the [Clean Water Act] . . . . There is no evidence 
that mitigation is meeting the objectives of the [Clean Water Act] and 
looking forward there is no reason to believe this will change unless new 
mitigation requirements and scientifically rigorous assessments are put in 
place.260 
 
In a broader synthesis paper published a few years earlier, Martin Doyle and F. 
Douglas Shields reached only slightly less damning conclusions. “The balance of 
published evidence,” they concluded, “suggests that current practices of stream 
restoration . . . cannot be assumed to provide demonstrable physical, chemical, or 
biological functional improvements.”261 Neither set of authors declared that effective 
compensatory mitigation for streams is an impossibility, and Doyle and Shields 
identified alternative ways by which mitigation practices might be improved.262 But 
they agreed, emphatically, that present practices were inadequate.  
Those analyses might lead one to think that all the changes described in this 
Part have been for naught—that the Corps has simply come up with fancier 
regulatory mechanisms to paper over the same old environmentally destructive 
practices. And that conclusion would be consistent with much of the legal-academic 
literature on compensatory mitigation, some of which decries the practice as a sham, 
“a myth,” or, at worst, a practice that actually enables environmental destruction.263 
But before drawing that conclusion, it is important to consider two mitigating facts 
about stream mitigation.  
The first is that stream mitigation practices are not a replacement for policies 
that forbade stream impacts. Many legal critiques of compensatory mitigation 
implicitly assume that if compensatory mitigation were not available, projects would 
simply be stopped.264 That assumption is questionable. Political support for 
environmental regulations that simply block development exists only in rare 
circumstances; as one veteran regulator explained to me, “there is no stopping 
things, with very, very, very limited exceptions.”265 Instead, at worst, we have traded 
a circumstance in which stream impacts occur and are not mitigated at all for one in 
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262 Id. at 7–13. 
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Walker et al., Why Bartering Biodiversity Fails, 2 CONSERVATION LETTERS 149, 152 (2009). 
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42 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 1 
which those impacts occur and are partially mitigated.266 Partial mitigation may 
sound disappointing, and it may fall short of what the Clean Water Act and its 
implementing regulations seem to require, but it is usually better than nothing. 
Second, sometimes merely requiring that a practice be done at all is a necessary 
predicate to requiring that it be done well. Indeed, that was exactly the rationale of 
the North Carolina agency staff who first pushed the practice: they knew present 
stream valuation and restoration practices stood on weak scientific footing, but they 
thought the most effective way to generate more science—and better stream 
protection—was to create a regulatory need for that science. “If you build the rules,” 
one staff member explained, “the science will come.”267 Environmental lawyers tend 
to think of environmental law as a field spurred by scientific advances, and 
sometimes it is.268 But sometimes the causal relationships work the other way 
around, and stream mitigation exemplifies that alternative dynamic.269 
And the science is coming along. Much of the research discussed in Part I of 
this Article is fairly recent, and the volume of stream-related research has increased 
greatly in recent decades. Restoration science also is evolving; even critics of 
existing practices have also offered ideas about how stream restoration might be 
done better.270 And the Corps and the EPA have been receptive to those new ideas. 
In interviews, agency staff readily acknowledged that they still have much to learn 
about stream mitigation, and that their practices are continuing to evolve, but they 
also spoke of their commitment to making those improvements.271 To provide one 
example of that evolution, regulators have published guidance on using ecological 
functions, rather than linear feet or simple measures of physical morphology, as the 
                                                      
266 The existence of a mitigation requirement also creates an economic incentive to 
avoid stream impacts (and thus avoid the cost of mitigation), and that incentive exists 
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268 See James D. Fine & Dave Owen, Technocracy and Democracy: Conflicts Between 
Models and Participation in Environmental Law and Planning, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 901, 907–
10 (2005). 
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271 See Telephone Interview with Regulatory Dist. Chief (Sept. 12, 2014) (“[W]hat we 
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currency for compensatory stream mitigation.272 If widely adopted, that alternative 
currency would create an incentive for restoring streams so they actually work like 
natural streams, rather than merely looking like natural streams.273 Similarly, 
regulators are also allowing experimentation with alternative methods of stream 
restoration, like dam removal, that hold more promise than simply using bulldozers 
to reshape a stream channel.274 These initiatives underscore a broader point. 
Environmental restoration is complicated, difficult work, and it takes learning and 
experimentation to do it well. With stream mitigation, that learning process has just 
begun. 
Of course, it is one thing to identify some learning improvement and another to 
say that substantial progress has been made, or will continue to occur. On the former 
front, the debates still are vigorous.275 On the latter, there are no guarantees. 
Effective compensatory mitigation practices require sustained and effective 
government oversight.276 And, as the opposition to the Clean Water Rule indicates, 
the very idea of government regulation remains under attack, particularly in the 
stream mitigation heartland of the southeast.277 In one possible future, regulatory 
agencies and environmental advocates—and, perhaps, mitigation bankers, whose 
business model depends upon credible regulators—will keep regulatory oversight in 
place.278 But in another plausible future, scientists and some regulators will develop 
an increasingly sophisticated understanding of good stream mitigation practices, 
only to see regulators lose the will, or the capacity, to put those practices into effect. 
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2.  Beyond the Stream Channel 
 
In a second way, the changes described above are an incomplete story. With 
limited exceptions, the legal reforms have focused on streams rather than 
surrounding landscapes. The combination of Clean Water Act sections 301 and 404 
prohibits unpermitted discharges of dredged or fill material to streams, and to other 
waters of the United States, and that is all.279 Those sections do not prohibit 
developing nonwetland riparian areas adjacent to streams.280 Nor do they prohibit 
building parking lots and roofs throughout a watershed, and thus altering flow 
patterns until streams are overloaded with flood flows and pollutants.281 Nor do those 
sections prohibit groundwater pumping that drains streams dry.282 In short, they 
protect streams from just one of the many threats that beset them. And that limited 
protection, no matter how stringently it is implemented, will often be insufficient to 
protect water quality in streams. 
In theory, other laws might fill those gaps. Other parts of the Clean Water Act, 
and of other federal statutes, can reach where section 404 cannot.283 Similarly, state 
and local governments have broad authority to regulate land use practices, and they 
could invoke that authority to restrain practices that harm streams.284 Sometimes 
they do.285 But in many places, state or local stream protections are weak or 
nonexistent, with legislatures and local governments preferring to let the federal 
government take the lead.286 And federal assertions of authority are inhibited by the 
substantial costs of retrofitting landscapes to protect small streams, and by the ever-
present arguments that federal stream protections represent infringements on 
traditional state and local land use authority.287 Despite those limitations, the EPA is 
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still trying, in multiple ways, to encourage development and redevelopment patterns 
that are more consistent with water quality.288 But some of the boldest regulatory 
levers, like a major new stormwater rule, still lie unused.289 
For all of these reasons, the evolution of stream law still is a work in progress, 
and a work that cannot be completed under section 404 alone. But that should not 
detract from the significance of the changes that have already occurred. The United 
States has shifted from a legal regime in which protections were nearly nonexistent 
to one in which protections are partial but increasingly widespread, and unevenly 
effective but improving. In the messy and halting real world of environmental 
policymaking, that is a very big deal. 
 
III.  LESSONS FROM LITTLE STREAMS 
 
So why does this story matter? The most straightforward answer is that an 
ecologically important and geographically pervasive resource now receives more 
protection than it once did, and there is room for additional change. That alone 
justifies attention to the emergence of stronger regulatory protections for streams. 
But the story is also interesting because key elements of it diverge from some of the 
darker narratives of present-day environmental law. Not all of the story so diverges, 
and perhaps the most important lesson of this whole study is the banal point that 
environmental policymaking is messy, complicated, and unpredictable. But those 
areas of divergence should provide a reminder that even in times of polarization and 
conflict, environmental law can and does evolve, in its fitful, incremental way. 
Many of those dark narratives begin with gridlock. Congress, in the standard 
telling, cannot agree internally on, or obtain White House support for, meaningful 
changes to environmental laws, and statutory environmental law therefore has 
changed little—for better or worse—since 1990.290 As many commentators have 
noted, that still leaves the possibility of action from agencies and the courts.291 But 
the courts do not seem as receptive to far-reaching environmental litigation as they 
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might have been in the 1970s or 1980s,292 and administrative law theory provides 
many reasons to expect little of agencies. According to various competing theories 
of agency behavior, administrative agencies are either captured tools of the 
industries they are supposed to regulate293 or single-minded technocrats oblivious to 
the collateral costs of the controls they impose.294 It is no surprise, then, that a future 
premised on administrative-level reforms strikes many people as a depressing 
prospect.     
To be fair, not everyone shares these views, and many people who do hold them 
would readily acknowledge that there are exceptional circumstances. And this is by 
no means the first article to chronicle the alternative pathways through which 
environmental law continues to evolve.295 With the recent election, stasis and 
gridlock are also beginning to strike many people as a comparatively desirable state 
of affairs. But even before the election, the darker stories emerged with striking 
frequency, and they contributed to a widespread—and, perhaps, self-fulfilling—
sense of policy malaise. That malaise heightens the importance of reminders, 
wherever one may find them, that there are more promising possibilities for 
environmental law.  
 
A.  Government Agencies as Engines of Reform 
 
One key element of many traditional narratives of environmental law is their 
emphasis on actors external to government agencies—and their associated disdain 
for the agencies themselves. For environmental advocates, this emphasis is quite old. 
Even during the founding era of environmental law, environmentalists and their 
allied scholars were centrally focused on identifying legal mechanisms that would 
compel recalcitrant government regulators to act, or to stop environmental 
destructive agencies from acting. The public trust doctrine, as articulated by Joseph 
Sax, and the citizen suit were classic legal responses to this concern.296 The agency, 
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in this view, might be a necessary vehicle for navigating the road toward 
environmental progress, but that vehicle was deeply unreliable.297 Congress, 
therefore, would provide a clear map, through the substantive—and highly 
specific—mandates of its statutes, and citizen litigation would provide the backup 
engine.298 
Critics outside the environmental movement often express similar views of 
agency dynamics. One of the central tenets of public choice theory—a particularly 
influential theory within the field of administrative law—is that agencies function 
as rational, self-interested actors as they respond to incentives created by external 
actors.299 They act to please powerful interest groups or politicians (whose behavior, 
in turn, can be explained by similar rational-actor models), rather than placing their 
own distinctive stamp on policymaking.300 Many public choice theorists may 
disagree with environmentalists only in their assessment of where environmental 
groups sit within this model; they perceive environmental groups as just another 
special interest within the public choice model, rather than as an antidote to public 
choice dynamics.301 But the premise of agencies as passive policymakers remains 
largely the same.302 Only the critics who perceive agencies as single-minded 
regulatory zealots seem ready to credit—or, more accurately, curse—the idea that 
an agency could be an engine of legal change. But even those critics still often seem 
to be describing agencies as somewhat inhuman automatons, eagerly grasping power 
but incapable of considered judgment. 
There is no question that the public choice models, at least, can explain some 
of the actions of environmental regulators. Citizen suits have played vital roles in 
the development of environmental law, and other public choice dynamics can help 
explain agency priorities and, often, agencies’ reluctance to act.303 More specifically, 
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these critiques also can shed light on some aspects of the story of stream regulation, 
for interest groups clearly were, and remain, influentially involved.304 But often 
these critiques underemphasize the dynamic role played by agency culture and 
mission. They underplay, in other words, the reality that agencies often are policy 
instigators, not just reactive bodies. 
Examples of that affirmative role recur throughout the recent history of stream 
regulation. Initially, the Corps provided little protection for streams largely because 
many of the engineers and military personnel who dominated the agency genuinely 
believed in building things.305 And as the agency’s staffing, culture, and mission 
began to reorient around the Clean Water Act’s regulatory mandate—and as the 
regulatory program had more people to do its work—so too did the scope of 
protections.306 Environmental litigation helped spur that reorientation, as did the 
persistent advocacy of partner federal and state agencies.307 But Corps staff also 
began providing more protection to streams because providing more protection just 
seemed like the appropriate thing to do. Repeatedly, staff told me that leaving 
streams out of their protective systems just did not make sense to them, given the 
basic mandate of the Clean Water Act and their increasing understanding of the 
ecological importance of tributary streams.308 They moved toward protecting 
streams, in other words, not—or, at least, not just—to acquiesce to pressure from 
environmental groups, but also because they viewed that protection as part of their 
agency mission. 
The timing of changes in protection also underscores the importance of an 
agency’s internal sense of direction. The evolution of modern stream protection 
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began in earnest during President Bill Clinton’s second term, at a time when the 
administration was embracing a variety of environmentally protective initiatives.309 
But it continued through the 2000s, when the nation was governed by an 
administration whose environmental philosophy was, as one professor aptly put it, 
“anything industry wants.”310 During the George W. Bush Administration, the Corps 
issued a regulatory guidance letter endorsing requirements for stream mitigation, 
lowered thresholds on nationwide permits to include coverage for ephemeral 
streams, further endorsed stream mitigation—under more rigorous rules—in the 
2008 compensatory mitigation rule, and expanded the practice on the ground.311 The 
movement was not entirely one way; the 2002 nationwide permits also added waiver 
provisions and did very little to advance regulation of the stream fills associated with 
mountaintop removal mining.312 But little streams had more protection at the end of 
the Bush Administration than they did at the beginning. And while Congress played 
a minor role, much of the change occurred because the Corps and the EPA were 
simply taking what they saw as logical next steps toward fulfilling their protective 
mission.313   
This evolution supports more emphasis on the role of agencies in instigating, 
and sustaining, environmental policy reform. Give an agency a mission and a 
statutory mandate, and money to hire staff drawn to that mission and mandate, and 
it will probably try to turn that mandate into reality. The process may be quite slow, 
particularly if it requires changing agency culture, and forces external to the agency 
will be important. But those external forces are not the only variables that matter, or 
even close to it. Within agencies, the streams story suggests, there can be an evolving 
sense of direction and a powerful engine of reform. That engine may run in low gear, 
but over time it can transform a regulatory program. 
 
B.  Beyond Zero-Sum 
 
Another of the central, and deeply negative, narratives of environmental policy 
have become the story of the trenches. The basic idea is that environmentalists and 
industry are largely dug in, with agencies stuck in the cross fire in between, and with 
neither side able to advance.314 Of course, industry and environmental advocates 
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often allege that the agency has gone to bed with the opposing army, but the trench 
metaphor still holds. And in trench warfare, one side’s advance is necessarily the 
other side’s retreat. The game is adversarial and zero-sum.  
Clearly, this description sometimes fits quite well. The conflicts between the 
coal industry and the Clean Air Act provide perhaps the most salient example; given 
its heavy impacts and marginal economics, it is becoming increasingly difficult to 
imagine a future in which the coal industry thrives amid meaningful environmental 
protections.315 Indeed, the conflicts over protecting streams from mountaintop 
removal mining are just one manifestation of this larger dynamic.316 Advances in 
protection there have occurred belatedly and litigiously, and the political battles 
remain intense.317 
But many of the changes in stream protection have not looked like trench 
warfare. Initially, the mere fact that so much has changed belies the analogy. In 
classic trench warfare, there was not much movement. Also, except for the battles 
of valley fills, the changes that have occurred have not been particularly litigious. A 
search of Lexis or Westlaw for cases involving stream regulation produces 
surprisingly few hits, and the only fact patterns that seem to arise with any 
consistency—other than the mountaintop removal cases discussed above—involve 
jurisdictional determinations.318 Even those are not particularly plentiful. Many legal 
actions never make it into Lexis and Westlaw databases, so these searches were 
almost certainly somewhat underinclusive. But even with that caveat, the small 
number of cases suggests that until recently, regulated entities have not gotten all 
that worked up about the shift.319 
Similarly, political responses to the shift toward stream regulation have—at 
times—been muted. That certainly is not the case right now; the political response 
to the Clean Water Rule has been anything but calm and measured.320 But previous 
changes—the incremental decreases in permitting thresholds, the expansion of 
compensatory mitigation requirements, and even the 2008 rule that affirmed, on a 
nationwide basis, the importance of stream mitigation—provoked little media 
coverage or political response.321 Indeed, in the very few media accounts to even 
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315 See Brian Palmer, Does Coal Have a Future in the United States?, PAC. STANDARD 
(May 13, 2015), http://www.psmag.com/nature-and-technology/does-coal-have-a-future-in-
the-united-states [https://perma.cc/X863-TQ37]. 
316 See supra notes 200–219.  
317 Supra notes 200–219. 
318 I base this assertion on a series of Westlaw searches that I and my research assistant 
conducted over the summer of 2015. 
319 Alternatively, it suggests that regulated entities are resting all their hopes on a grand 
battle over Clean Water Act jurisdiction. 
320 See supra notes 2–6 and accompanying text. 
321 For the only mainstream media articles I could find that discuss the final 2008 rule, 
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discuss the 2008 rule, the only criticisms came from environmentalists.322 John 
Boehner, it seems, said nothing at all. 
Why is that? The obvious answer is that the present critiques fit with the 
favorite narrative of a party that was, until recently, in the opposition, and that 
narrative would not have worked so well with a Republican sitting in the Oval 
Office. But there is an additional possible explanation, which also fits poorly with 
the narrative of zero-sum trench warfare: in many circumstances, regulated 
industries could accommodate the changes. 
If one of the dominant trends of stream and wetlands protection has been 
expanding protections, the other key trend has been a move toward more efficient 
modes of protection. Even with lowering thresholds, most of the Corps’s permits are 
general permits, and general permits issue relatively quickly and cheaply.323 For 
even a modest-scale development project, their cost will be a tiny portion of the 
overall budget. The emergence of in-lieu fee programs and a sophisticated mitigation 
banking industry has also simplified the process of complying with permit terms.324 
A builder needs only to persuade a Corps office that impacts are unavoidable, and 
that they cannot be further minimized, and then write a check. And the Corps has 
also worked on a variety of other mechanisms, from standardized mitigation 
agreements to creating consolidated multi-agency permitting processes, all designed 
to increase the efficiency of permitting processes.325 
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322 E.g., Heilprin, supra note 321. 
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52 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 1 
There will always be outliers who reject the whole process and, if they are 
caught, wind up in court.326 But for most of the repeat players who work with the 
404 program, stream protection may be an increasingly predictable cost of doing 
business. Sometimes it may even wind up being a benefit. If avoiding stream fills 
ultimately means that a development does not flood, or if buyers decide they like the 
way a little green space looks, protecting streams may ultimately produce positive 
economic returns. 
 
C.  The Alternative History of Environmental Law 
 
Many environmental lawyers and law teachers—particularly those who 
identify with the environmental movement—are drawn to stories of epic battles. 
Fights over massive dam proposals or old-growth logging inspire generation after 
generation of law students and frame the worldviews of both professors and 
practicing attorneys. And those stories often follow a particular trajectory, with 
recalcitrant agencies declining, largely because of intense industry pressure, to fulfill 
the mandates set forth by the forward-thinking legislators of the 1970s and 1980s.327 
Bold lawsuits follow.328 Sometimes the environmentalists win; sometimes they 
lose.329 But the roles stay largely constant—unless conservative advocacy groups or 
politicians are telling the tales. Then, everything shifts; the villains are 
environmental zealots within and outside the halls of the EPA and other federal 
agencies, and the righteous victims are the defenders of employment, free enterprise, 
and rational thought.330 But within that second set of stories, a similar kind of internal 
uniformity persists. 
But if the recent history of stream protection is also a microcosm of 
environmental law history, then how else might that history be told? We might start 
by acknowledging that the legislators of the 1970s and 1980s, for all their foresight, 
underestimated the complexities of the tasks they assigned to administrative 
regulators. In particular, they underestimated the extent to which environmental 
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progress would require picky, detailed attention to thousands of small threats.331 The 
incremental effects of thousands of little stream fills are just one example of this 
phenomenon.332 The Congresses of environmental law’s early years gave regulators 
the authority to respond to those problems, but neither they nor the agencies they 
empowered had the toolboxes or the experience to undertake the difficult, and 
sometimes intrusive, tasks involved in administering this brave new regime.333 What 
followed, then, was a long period when the gaps between environmental mandates 
and actual practice were extraordinarily large and agencies were not quite sure how 
those gaps could be closed—and in which some efforts at closure were both clumsy 
and ineffective.334  
Things are very different now. The United States may no longer pass significant 
environmental statutes; the glory years of environmental legislating are over. But 
the other key story of the last thirty years has been the evolution of administrative 
protections. Across many different subfields of environmental law, agencies have 
moved, slowly and fitfully, toward expanding and improving the protections offered 
within existing statutory bounds. Central to that movement has been an increasing 
intolerance of harms that might once have been written off as de minimis. The shift 
is by no means complete; there are still many gaps between the ambitions of the 
statutes of the 1970s and 1980s and the regulatory practices of the present day.335 
And figuring out ways to use limited, and often declining, staffing levels and budgets 
to regulate increasing numbers of pollution sources remains an enormous challenge 
for environmental agencies.336 But from hazardous waste management to stormwater 
regulation to stream fills, environmental law is filled with examples of gradually 
increasing regulatory protection.337  
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Regulated industries (and regulated governmental entities and individuals) 
have sometimes been an implacable opponent of those changes. But at the same time 
agencies have learned to protect more, they also have learned to protect in ways 
more solicitous of the regulated, and the regulated have learned to work with the 
new regulatory regimes.338 General permits, compensatory mitigation programs, and 
more cooperative enforcement regimes, to provide a few examples, have all been 
designed to make regulation work better for regulated industries.339 And the growth 
of the environmental consulting industry,340 the emergence of private certification 
systems,341 and an increasing embrace of environmental management systems and 
self-auditing programs,342 to provide a few more examples, have all offered 
industries ways to take charge of their own compliance, and to integrate 
environmental requirements into functioning business models. Perhaps, then, our 
dominant narrative should not be of gridlock. Instead, it might be a story of a process 
of mutual accommodation, in which the regulated and the regulators gradually work 
toward turning the ambitious but somewhat naïve mandates of the 1970s into 
functional realities. 
Of course, this alternative story is not independent of the classic narratives of 
conflict. Individual players are often playing out both an accommodation and a 
confrontation strategy, and outcomes in legislatures and courts inform everyone’s 
willingness to negotiate. Sometimes that intertwinement is symbiotic; a lawsuit 
often is the jumpstart that kicks more collaborative processes into gear.343 But the 
interconnections can also be problematic. In any process of social or regulatory 
change, there are players for whom conflict is an end, not just a means; for reasons 
of ideology, politics, or professional job security, they perceive accommodation as 
a direct threat. Those interrelationships are all the more reason for emphasizing, 
particularly in legal thought, the administrative evolution story of environmental 
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regulation. By professional disposition, as well as by human nature, lawyers are 
often drawn to conflict; it provides our best war stories and generates many of our 
billable hours. But there is a very real danger that, in our fixation on the classic 
courtroom battles, we will not just miss the quieter evolutionary processes that occur 
outside the spotlight. We may fail to nurture them, or even stunt their growth through 
our persistent emphasis on conflict. 
If that all sounds abstract, consider, for a moment, the current fight over the 
Clean Water Rule. Most of the rule’s opponents have cast the rule as a massive 
power grab that will devastate key sectors of the American economy.344 While their 
arguments are more measured, some environmental groups have argued that the rule 
actually relinquishes key protections, with disturbing consequences for water 
quality.345 And no doubt many advocates have convinced themselves that these 
stories are true, and that they justify the many legal actions against the new rule. But 
a more prosaic possibility is that the rule makes slight adjustments to the existing 
scope of jurisdiction, and that even before the rule emerged, the Corps and the EPA 
were continuing to develop slowly-improving protections for streams and wetlands, 
and were offering those protections in ways industries could live with. That story 
does not resonate as well with standard narratives of environmental law, and the 
Clean Water Rule may well end because judges or legislators or a president believe 
that agencies are on the rampage, and that reining them in is the only way to restore 
our constitutional balance. But in this circumstance, a more prosaic story just 




In 1972, Congress passed a statute whose text offered sweeping protection for 
waterways across the nation. In theory, those protections extended to little streams. 
Actual practices were different, not just in the 1970s but also well into the 1990s.346 
But over the past twenty years, small streams have become a central focus of 
regulatory protection, with the extent and type of those protections continuing to 
evolve to this day, and with additional changes still possible. The future of that 
evolution is uncertain, and it may hang in the balance; Congress, the incoming 
administration, or the courts could nip much of this progress in the bud. But so long 
as it lasts, the story of little streams illustrates the continuing ability of environmental 
law to evolve and change, and the incremental—and often unnoticed—ways in 
which those changes occur.  
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